holding that “there is no right whatever — constitutional or otherwise — for a defendant to use false evidence,” and since there is “no permissible choice to testify falsely,” a criminal defendant is deprived of “neither his right to counsel nor the right to testify truthfully” by “defense counsel tak[ing] steps to persuade [him] to testify truthfully,” or risk counsel’s withdrawal
How later courts described this case
- holding that “there is no right whatever — constitutional or otherwise — for a defendant to use false evidence,” and since there is “no permissible choice to testify falsely,” a criminal defendant is deprived of “neither his right to counsel nor the right to testify truthfully” by “defense counsel tak[ing] steps to persuade [him] to testify truthfully,” or risk counsel’s withdrawal
- holding first that a plea deal is accepted by the defendant but rejected counsel's refusal to present perjured testimony by the judge, the issue raised here simply does not breached no professional duty and second that it arise. Much the same reasoning guides cases that cannot establish prejudice under Strickland
- holding “as a matter of law” that federal habeas petitioner could not show prejudice by his counsel’s refusal to allow him to perjure himself at trial “[e]ven ... assum[ing] that the jury might have believed his perjury”
- finding that an attorney does not breach a duty to his client in informing the court of his client’s intention to commit perjury and stating in dicta that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require disclosure
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Hampton, 818 So. 2d 720 (2002)
Therefore, Nix is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
concurring in the judgment.
This Court has no constitutional authority to establish rules of ethical conduct for lawyers practicing in the state courts. Nor does the Court enjoy any statutory grant of jurisdiction over legal ethics.
*177 Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Court emphasizes that it “must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the state’s proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.” Ante, at 165. I read this as saying in another way that the Court cannot tell the States or the lawyers in the States how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are violated.
Unfortunately, the Court seems unable to resist the temptation of sharing with the legal community its vision of ethical conduct. But let there be no mistake: the Court’s essay regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client’s suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without force of law. As Justice Blackmun observes, that issue is a thorny one, post, at 177-178, but it is not an issue presented by this case. Lawyers, judges, bar associations, students, and others should understand that the problem has not now been “decided.”
I join Justice Blackmun’s concurrence because I agree that respondent has failed to prove the kind of prejudice necessary to make out a claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).