explaining that rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness recognized in Pearce does not apply where “different sentencers assessed the varying sentences” so that harsher sentence imposed by a judge than the sentence imposed by a jury at a previous trial does not trigger a presumption of vindictiveness
How later courts described this case
- explaining that rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness recognized in Pearce does not apply where “different sentencers assessed the varying sentences” so that harsher sentence imposed by a judge than the sentence imposed by a jury at a previous trial does not trigger a presumption of vindictiveness
- explaining that the Court in Pearce had “applied a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information ... justifying the increased sentence” (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 102 5.Ct 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982))
- stating that, where the sentencer is not the same in the two proceedings, the sentencer imposing the second sentence has no personal stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to engage in self-vindication, rendering the threat of vindictiveness far more speculative than real
- explaining that the possibility of vindictiveness is speculative where the second sentence is imposed by a different trial justice who has "no motivation to engage in self-vindication" (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe , 412 U.S. 17 , 27, 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) )
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. James Mathurin, 868 F.3d 921 (2017)
See id. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201; see also Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (“The presumption is also inapplicable because different sentencers assessed the varying sentences that [the defendant] received.”); United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 506, 508 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In this case, the defendant’s second sentence was imposed by a different judge.
Distinguished by Balsavage v. Wetzel, 936 F. Supp. 2d 505 (2013)
Additionally, although the Third Circuit has not read McCullough as broadly as "to indicate that the Pearce presumption is inapplicable whenever the judge who imposed the second sentence had no reason to indulge in self-vindication,” Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1257 n. 16 (3d Cir.1992) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), even if it…
Distinguished by Fukusaku v. State, 126 Haw. 555 (2012)
475 U.S. at 135-40, 106 S.Ct. 976 (concluding that the presumption of vindictiveness was inapplicable where a judge imposed a harsher sentence after a retrial than had previously been imposed by a jury);
Distinguished by Parmelee v. Clarke, 251 F. App'x 450 (2007)
To the contrary, the Court reasoned in McCullough that, “[t]he presumption is also inapplicable because different sentencers assessed the varying sentences that [defendant] received.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
concurring in the judgment.
After respondent was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment upon his conviction for murder, Judge Harney granted respondent’s motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Under these circumstances, I believe that the possibility that an increased sentence upon retrial resulted from judicial vindictiveness is sufficiently remote that the presumption established in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), should not apply here. Because respondent has not shown that the 50-year sentence imposed by *145 Judge Harney after respondent’s retrial resulted from actual vindictiveness for having successfully attacked his first conviction,. I would reverse the judgment below.
I emphasize, however, that were I able to find that vindictiveness should be presumed here, I would agree with Justice Marshall that “the reasons offered by Judge Harney [were] far from adequate to rebut any presumption of vindictiveness.” Post, at 152. The Court’s dictum to the contrary, see ante, at 141-144, serves in my view only to distort the holding of Pearce .