holding that courts,' when evaluating due-process claims that challenge "the substance of a genuinely academic decision,” must "show great respect for [a] faculty’s professional judgment ... unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment”
How later courts described this case
- holding that courts,' when evaluating due-process claims that challenge "the substance of a genuinely academic decision,” must "show great respect for [a] faculty’s professional judgment ... unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment”
- holding that, even if a student’s assumed property interest in a six-year program of study culminating in an undergraduate degree and a medical degree “gave rise to a substantive right under the Due Process Clause to continued enrollment free from arbitrary state action, the facts of record disclose no such action”
- holding that, because a medical student did not have a substantive due-process right to re-take a nationally-standardized medical examination, the University faculty reasonably exercised its professional judgment to deny him that opportunity
- stating that a federal court should respect the faculty’s professional judgment and may override the decision only if it departs so substantially from accepted academic norms as to indicate the faculty did not actually exercise that judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Powell,
concurring.
Although I join the Court’s opinion holding that respondent presents no violation of the substantive due process right that he asserts, I think it unnecessary to assume the existence of such a right on the facts of this case. Respondent alleges that he had a property interest in his continued enroll *229 ment in the University’s Inteflex program, and that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious. The dismissal allegedly violated his substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, providing the basis for his claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 .
I
As the Court correctly points out, respondent’s claim to a property right is dubious at best. Ante, at 222, n. 7. Even if one assumes the existence of a property right, however, not every such right is entitled to the protection of substantive due process. While property interests are protected by procedural due process even though the interest is derived from state law rather than the Constitution, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972), substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution.
The history of substantive due process “counsels caution and restraint.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J., for a plurality). The determination that a substantive due process right exists is a judgment that “ ‘certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.’” Ibid., quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the context of liberty interests, this Court has been careful to examine each asserted interest to determine whether it “merits” the protection of substantive due process. See, e. g., East Cleveland, supra; Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). “Each new claim to [substantive due process] protection must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed.” Poe, supra, at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The interest asserted by respondent — an interest in continued enrollment from which he derives a right to retake the NBME — is essentially a state-law contract right. It bears little resemblance to the fundamental interests that previ *230 ously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution. It certainly is not closely tied to “respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms,” Griswold, supra, at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). For these reasons, briefly summarized, I do not think the fact that Michigan may have labeled this interest “property” entitles it to join those other, far more important interests that have heretofore been accorded the protection of substantive due process. Cf. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U. S. 194 (1979).
h — i 1 — 1
I agree fully with the Court’s emphasis on the respect and deference that courts should accord academic decisions made by the appropriate university authorities. In view of Ewing’s academic record that the Court charitably characterizes as “unfortunate,” this is a case that never should have been litigated. After a 4-day trial in a District Court, the case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and now is the subject of a decision of the United States Supreme Court. Judicial review of academic decisions, including those with respect to the admission or dismissal of students, is rarely appropriate, particularly where orderly administrative procedures are followed — as in this case. *
See Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 96, n. 6 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), cited ante, at 225, n. 11. See also University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment”); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967).