holding that the plaintiffs had “received the benefits to which they claimed to be entitled after filing their lawsuit” and were “under no threat of further injury as a result of defendant’s conduct” such that they “lacked a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ required to assure the concrete adverseness necessary for the resolution of constitutional questions”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the plaintiffs had “received the benefits to which they claimed to be entitled after filing their lawsuit” and were “under no threat of further injury as a result of defendant’s conduct” such that they “lacked a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ required to assure the concrete adverseness necessary for the resolution of constitutional questions”
- recognizing, in the context of an Eleventh Amendment immunity claim where there was no ongoing violation to enjoin, that courts could order prospective relief, including ancillary measures to appropriate prospective relief, but could not award money damages or restitution, despite a "dispute about the lawfulness of [state actor's] past actions"
- holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents federal courts from providing a declaratory judgment that state officials violated federal law in the past if there is "no claimed continuing violation of federal law" or "any threat of state officials violating the ... law in the future"
- explaining that a declaratory judgment is not available to evaluate the legality of past state conduct where the Eleventh The Workforce Development Area of Northwest Page 10 v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. Amendment would bar the court from awarding damages
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (2003)
The holding of Green is inapplicable here because there is a continuing violation of federal law for which a valid injunction has been issued.
Distinguished by Children's Hospital and Health Center, a Washington Corporation v. S. Kimberly Belshe, Director, California Department of Health Services, 188 F.3d 1090 (1999)
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), on which the CDHS relies, is inapposite.
Distinguished by Clerk of the Circuit Court v. NVR Homes, Inc., 222 B.R. 514 (1998)
474 U.S. 64, 73-74, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), this general prohibition is inapposite to NVR's motion here at issue.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
I joined Justice Brennan’s dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 247 (1985), and I join his dissent in this case. I fully agree that the Court’s Eleventh Amendment approach, as demonstrated by the difference between the result in this case and that in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), is sterile, produces inconsistent decisions, and is in serious need of reconsideration. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 539, 546-547 (1985).
But I also would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case for the additional reason expressed in my dissent (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) in Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 302 , namely, the waiver by Michigan, “as a willing recipient of federal funds,” id., at 304 , of any Eleventh Amendment barrier that otherwise might exist. The State too easily avoids its responsibilities, and the Court by its decision today allows the State to go its way unimpeded and unburdened with any remedy for those who have been wronged during the period of Michigan’s noncompliance with federal law.