explaining that materiality after being warned by the judge that this would open the door to hostile exists when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been evidence and after consulting with B owling himself. Bowling gives no disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been reason to think this was an unreasonable decision , and even if it was, different”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that materiality after being warned by the judge that this would open the door to hostile exists when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been evidence and after consulting with B owling himself. Bowling gives no disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been reason to think this was an unreasonable decision , and even if it was, different”
- reasoning the prosecutor's failure to disclose any monetary inducements, as well as its disclosure of affidavits stating the witnesses received no promises of a reward, misled the defendant to believe that the witnesses could not be impeached when, in actuality, "the possibility of a reward gave [the witnesses] a direct, personal stake in [the defendant's] conviction"
- holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose before trial that federal agents had contracted to pay the witnesses for information and testimony against the defendant was constitutional error only if there was a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different had the information been disclosed
- finding that a failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence results in constitutional error regardless of whether the defendant requested production of such evidence, and determining that the proper standard for evaluating suppressed evidence was whether it suggested a "reasonable probability” that the verdict was incorrect
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (1986)
9 U.S. v. Bagley, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (plurality opinion) has cast doubt on Phillips's creation of a distinct standard for evidence that only impeaches a witness.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Blumberg v. Garcia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (2010)
473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, is inapposite.
Distinguished by Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38 (1988)
While we do not find that Bagley is inapplicable to the issue presented here, we elect to rely on Giglio because the facts presented before us more closely parallel those in Giglio.
The opinion
*685 Justice White,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that respondent is not entitled to have his conviction overturned unless he can show that the evidence withheld by the Government was “material,” and I therefore join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. I also agree with Justice Blackmun that for purposes of this inquiry, “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ante, at 682. As the Justice correctly observes, this standard is “sufficiently flexible” to cover all instances of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. Ibid. Given the flexibility of the standard and the inherently fact-bound nature of the cases to which it will be applied, however, I see no reason to attempt to elaborate on the relevance to the inquiry of the specificity of the defense’s request for disclosure, either generally or with respect to this case. I would hold simply that the proper standard is one of reasonable probability and that the Court of Appeals’ failure to apply this standard necessitates reversal. I therefore concur in the judgment.