holding that general consent to suit provision in Article III, § 5, of the California Constitution, providing “[sjuits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law” did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity because the “provision does not specifically indicate the [sjtate’s willingness to be sued in federal court”
How later courts described this case
- holding that general consent to suit provision in Article III, § 5, of the California Constitution, providing “[sjuits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law” did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity because the “provision does not specifically indicate the [sjtate’s willingness to be sued in federal court”
- holding that a state constitutional provision providing that “[s]uits may be brought against the State . . . in such courts as shall be directed by law” was insufficient to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity because such a waiver “must specify the State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court”
- finding that § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides for suits in federal court against "any recipient of Federal assistance" fell "far short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State's con- sent to waive its constitutional immunity"
- finding that S 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides for suits in federal court against "any recipient of Federal assistance" fell "far short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded on other grounds by Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) — not on the Supreme Court's list
473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 20, 199629 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported superseded by statute, as recognized in Lane v. Pena — not on the Supreme Court's list
473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 20, 199613 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itQuestioned by Turner v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 651 F. Supp. 233 (1986)
Whatever the continuing vitality of Parden, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985), the logic of a state’s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity would not automatically extend to Congressional intent to waive federal sovereign immunity.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Because my decision to join Justice Brennan’s dissent is a departure from the opinion I expressed in Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 151 (1981), a word of explanation is in order. As I then explained, notwithstanding my belief that Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), was incorrectly decided, see 450 U. S., at 151, n. 2 ,1 then concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis required that Edelman be followed. Since then, however, the Court has not felt constrained by stare decisis in its expansion of the protective mantle of sovereign immunity— having repudiated at least 28 cases in its decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 165-166, n. 50 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) — and additional study has made it abundantly clear that not only Edelman , but Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), as well, can properly be characterized as “egregiously incorrect.” 450 U. S., at 153 . I am now persuaded that a fresh examination of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will produce benefits that far outweigh “the consequences of further unraveling the doctrine of stare decisis” in this area of the law. Id., at 155 .