involving a union shop agreement and the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3): “Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of employment.... By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union.”
How later courts described this case
- involving a union shop agreement and the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3): “Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of employment.... By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union.”
- recognizing right of employees to refrain from concerted union activities by being able to resign union membership without interference.
- stating that “[u]nder Section 8(b)(1)(A
- “We decide today whether a union is precluded from fining employees who have attempted to resign when resignations are prohibited by the union’s constitution.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
The legislative history of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, discussed in Part I-B of Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion, coupled with the plain language in the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), persuades me that the “right to refrain” protected by §7 of the Act does not encompass the “right to resign.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.