explaining that “‘[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record’” and holding that a false credit report regarding the plaintiff was not a matter of public concern
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “‘[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record’” and holding that a false credit report regarding the plaintiff was not a matter of public concern
- holding that presumed and punitive damages could be awarded to private figure plaintiff on the basis of a negligently-made, false, defamatory statement on a matter of only private concern, without a showing of constitutional malice by clear and convincing evidence
- determining that a state may allow recovery of damages in certain defamation cases after balancing “the State‟s interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression”
- recognizing “speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience . . . warrants no special protection . . . to ensure that debate on public issues will be uninhibited, robust and wide-open”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Patrick v. Cleveland Scene Publishing, 582 F. Supp. 2d 939 (2008)
472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) are inapposite.
The opinion
Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the judgment.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), contrary to well-established common law prevailing in the states, a divided Court held that a private plaintiff in a defamation action cannot recover for a published falsehood unless he proves that the defendant was at least negligent in publishing the falsehood. The Court further held that there can be no “presumed” damages in such an action and that the private plaintiff cannot receive “punitive” damages unless it is established that the publication was made with “actual malice,” as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964).
I dissented in Gertz because I believed that, insofar as the “ordinary private citizen” was concerned, 418 U. S., at 355 , the Court’s opinion “abandoned] the traditional thread,” id., at 354-355 , that had been the theme of the law in this country *764 up to that time. I preferred “to allow this area of law to continue to evolve as it [had] up to [then] with respect to private citizens rather than embark on a new doctrinal theory which [had] no jurisprudential ancestry.” Ibid. Gertz, however, is now the law of the land, and until it is overruled, it must, under the principle of stare decisis, be applied by this Court.
The single question before the Court today is whether Gertz applies to this case. The plurality opinion holds that Gertz does not apply because, unlike the challenged expression in Gertz , the alleged defamatory expression in this case does not relate to a matter of public concern. I agree that Gertz is limited to circumstances in which the alleged defamatory expression concerns a matter of general public importance, and that the expression in question here relates to a matter of essentially private concern. I therefore agree with the plurality opinion to the extent that it holds that Gertz is inapplicable in this case for the two reasons indicated. No more is needed to dispose of the present case.
I continue to believe, however, that Gertz was ill-conceived, and therefore agree with Justice White that Gertz should be overruled. I also agree generally with Justice White’s observations concerning New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. New York Times, however, equates “reckless disregard of the truth” with malice; this should permit a jury instruction that malice may be found if the defendant is shown to have published defamatory material which, in the exercise of reasonable care, would have'' been revealed as untrue. But since the Court has not applied the literal language of New York Times in this way, I agree with Justice White that it should be reexamined. The great rights guaranteed by the First Amendment carry with them certain responsibilities as well.
Consideration of these issues inevitably recalls an aphorism of journalism that “too much checking on the facts has ruined many a good news story.”