stating that when a legislature intends “that there be only one offense – that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not under both – there would be no statutory authorization for a subsequent prosecution after conviction of one of the two provisions, and that would end the double jeopardy analysis”
How later courts described this case
- stating that when a legislature intends “that there be only one offense – that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not under both – there would be no statutory authorization for a subsequent prosecution after conviction of one of the two provisions, and that would end the double jeopardy analysis”
- holding that the defendant’s prosecution for a continuing criminal enterprise under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 following, his earlier prosecution for marijuana importation did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
- holding if the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history that a defendant can be convicted and punished under different statute for the same conduct, there can be no double jeopardy violation
- recognizing that the legislature intended CCE to be a separate offense and to permit prosecution for predicate offenses as well as CCE, and concluding that convictions for both does not violate double jeopardy
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled by Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list
495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), overruled Garrett
Reported overruled by Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Rutledge overruled Garrett
Reported overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) — not on the Supreme Court's list
We are not persuaded by Mr. Pearson’s argument that United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), overruled Garrett and Hunter and established Blockberger’s same elements test as the sole test for whether multiple punishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. Kenneth Christian — not on the Supreme Court's list
471 U.S. 773 , 105 S. Ct. 2407 , 85 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in United States v. Christian, 614 F. App’x 1001
Questioned by United States v. Crosby, 20 F.3d 480 (1994)
When this appeal was briefed and argued, the continuing validily of Garrett was called into question on account of the Supreme Court’s intervening holding in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2087, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct th…
Questioned by United States v. Yin Poy Louie, 625 F. Supp. 1327 (1985)
- U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985), casts doubt on the applicability of double jeopardy in the circumstance of a prosecution for a continuing enterprise offense following an earlier prosecution on a predicate act.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring.
I agree that, on the facts of this case, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar prosecution and sentencing under 21 U. S. C. § 848 for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise even though Garrett pleaded guilty to one of the predicate offenses in an earlier prosecution. This conclusion is admittedly in tension with certain language in prior opinions of the Court. E. g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 166 (1977). I write separately to explain why I believe that today’s holding comports with the fundamental purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and with the method of analysis used in our more recent decisions.
The Double Jeopardy Clause declares: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. This constitutional proscription serves primarily to preserve the finality of judgments in criminal prosecutions and to protect the defendant from prosecutorial overreaching. See, e. g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 493, 498-499 (1984); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 128, 136 (1980). In Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957), the Court explained:
“The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him *796 to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” Id., at 187-188 .
Decisions by this Court have consistently recognized that the finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is not absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal interest in prosecuting and convicting those who violate the law. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U. S. 31, 40 (1982); United States v. Tateo, 377 U. S. 463, 466 (1964). The Court accordingly has held that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction generally is subject to retrial. Tibbs, supra, at 40 . Similarly, double jeopardy poses no bar to another trial where a judge declares a mistrial because of “manifest necessity.” Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973). Such decisions indicate that absent “governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect,” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 91 (1978), the compelling public interest in punishing crimes can outweigh the interest of the defendant in having his culpability conclusively resolved in one proceeding. Tibbs, supra, at 41-44 .
Brown v. Ohio, supra, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense when he has already been tried and acquitted or convicted on a lesser included offense. Id., at 168-169. The concerns for finality that support this conclusion, however, are no more absolute than those involved in other contexts. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 152 (1977) (plurality opinion). Instead, successive prosecution on a greater offense may be permitted where justified by the public interest in law enforcement and the absence of prosecutorial overreaching. For example, in Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 449 (1912), the Court found no double jeopardy bar to a prosecution for murder where the victim of an assault died after the defendant’s trial for assault and battery. Diaz implies that prosecution for a lesser offense does not prevent subsequent prosecution for a greater offense where the latter *797 depends on facts occurring after the first trial. Dicta in Brown v. Ohio suggested that the same conclusion would apply where the later prosecution rests on facts that the government could not have discovered earlier through due diligence. 432 U. S., at 169, n. 7. See also Jeffers v. United States, supra, at 151-152.
Application of the rule of Brown v. Ohio is also affected by the actions of the defendant himself. In Jeffers v. United States, supra, the plurality opinion rejected a claim of double jeopardy where prosecution for a greater offense followed a guilty verdict for a lesser offense, and the successive prosecution resulted from the defendant’s opposition to consolidated trials. Id., at 152-154. Last Term, the Court relied on Jeffers to hold that where a court accepts, over the prosecution’s objection, a defendant’s guilty plea to lesser included offenses, double jeopardy does not prevent further prosecution on remaining, greater offenses. Ohio v. Johnson, supra, at 501-502 . After noting the State’s interest in convicting those who have violated its laws and the absence of governmental overreaching, Johnson observed that the defendant “should not be entitled to use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining charges.” 467 U. S., at 502 .
Turning to the circumstances of this case, I conclude that Garrett cannot validly argue that the Government is prevented from using evidence relating to his May 1981 conviction to prove his participation in a continuing criminal enterprise from January 1976 through July 1981. I am willing to assume, arguendo, that the 1981 conviction for importation of marihuana is a lesser included offense of the charges for violating 18 U. S. C. § 848 . As noted ante, at 788, 791-793, the Government both alleged and presented evidence that Garrett’s violation of §848 continued after the conviction on the lesser included offense. Although the Government alleged participation in the unlawful continuing enterprise through July 1981, none of the events occurring after the date of the earlier prosecution were essential elements to *798 prove a violation of § 848. Thus, this case falls somewhere between Diaz and Brown v. Ohio . The dissent reads the latter decision as limiting application of Diaz to circumstances where the facts necessary to the greater offense occur or are discovered after the first prosecution. Post, at 806-807. Although I find merit to this position, I reach a different conclusion upon balancing the interests protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The approach advocated by the dissent would effectively force the Government’s hand with respect to prosecution under §848. Under that approach, once the Government believes that facts sufficient to prove a continuing criminal enterprise exist, it can either bring charges under §848 or seek conviction only for a predicate offense while forgoing its later use to prove a continuing violation of § 848. The decision to bring charges under § 848, however, will necessarily and appropriately depend on prosecutorial judgments concerning the adequacy of the evidence, the efficient allocation of enforcement resources, and the desirability of seeking the statute’s severe sanctions. These considerations may be affected by events occurring after the last necessary predicate offense. Where the defendant continues unlawful conduct after the time the Government prosecutes him for a predicate offense, I do not think he can later contend that the Government is foreclosed from using that offense in another prosecution to prove the continuing violation of § 848. Cf. Jeffers, supra, at 154 . As the Court noted in another context, “the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.” United States v. Scott, supra, at 99 .
The Court’s holding does not leave the defendant unduly exposed to oppressive tactics by the Government. Any acquittal on a predicate offense would of course bar the Government from later attempting to relitigate issues in a prosecution under § 848. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970). *799 This fact will prevent the Government from “treating] the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution,” id., at 447 . Moreover, I note that we do not decide in this case whether a defendant would have a valid double jeopardy claim if the Government failed in a later prosecution to allege and to present evidence of a continuing violation of § 848 after an earlier conviction for a predicate offense. Certainly the defendant’s interest in finality would be more compelling where there is no indication of continuing wrongdoing after the first prosecution.
For the reasons stated, I agree that under the circumstances of this case the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar Garrett’s prosecution under § 848. Because I also agree that Congress intended to authorize separate punishment for the underlying predicate offenses and the violation of § 848,1 join the opinion of the Court.