holding that unindicted co-conspirator’s out-of-court confession would have been hearsay only if “jury had been asked to infer that [co-conspirator’s] confession proved that defendant participated in the murder” and was admissible to rebut defendant’s claim that his own confession resulted when sheriff “read from [co-conspirator’s] statement and directed [defendant] to say the same thing”
How later courts described this case
- holding that unindicted co-conspirator’s out-of-court confession would have been hearsay only if “jury had been asked to infer that [co-conspirator’s] confession proved that defendant participated in the murder” and was admissible to rebut defendant’s claim that his own confession resulted when sheriff “read from [co-conspirator’s] statement and directed [defendant] to say the same thing”
- concluding the Confrontation Clause was not implicated when confession of non-testifying accomplice was admitted at defendant’s trial for a nonhearsay purpose; the out-of-court statement was not offered to prove what happened at the murder scene but rather to rebut defendant’s testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice
- holding that non-testifying co-defendant’s confession was not hearsay when it was introduced to rebut defendant’s claim that his confession was coerced and derived from co-defendant’s confession, because confession was used only to show differences between the two confessions and not offered to prove the truth of the assertions therein
- stating that “the question is reduced to whether, in light of the competing values at stake, we 122 Case: 12-15093 Date Filed: 04/26/2017 Page: 123 of 281 may rely on the crucial assumption that the jurors followed the instructions given them by the trial judge,” and answering that question in the affirmative
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court today admitting Peele’s out-of-court confession for nonhearsay rebuttal purposes. I do so on the understanding that the trial court’s limiting instruction is not itself sufficient to justify admission of the confession. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). The out-of-court confession is admissible for nonhearsay purposes in this case only because that confession was essential to the State’s rebuttal of respondent Street’s defense and because nó alternative short of admitting the statement would have adequately served the State’s interest. See ante, at 415-416. With respect to the State’s need to admit the confession for rebuttal purposes, it is important to note that respondent created the need to admit the statement by pressing the defense that his confession was a coerced imitation of Peele’s out-of-court confession. * Also, the record *418 contains no suggestion that the State was engaged in any improper effort to place prejudicial hearsay evidence before the jury. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965). Under the circumstances of the present case, admission of the out-of-court confession for nonhearsay rebuttal purposes raises no Confrontation Clause problems.
In fact, at an earlier point in the trial respondent unsuccessfully sought to introduce Peele’s confession on the ground that it was “very material” to the argument that respondent’s confession was a coerced imitation. App. 41.