finding collateral legal consequences even when the defendant's "civil rights, including suffrage and the right to hold public office" were restored because the defendant is still subject to "the possibility that the conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might give in a future proceeding and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to persistent felony offender prosecution if he should go to trial on any other felony charges in the future"
How later courts described this case
- finding collateral legal consequences even when the defendant's "civil rights, including suffrage and the right to hold public office" were restored because the defendant is still subject to "the possibility that the conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might give in a future proceeding and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to persistent felony offender prosecution if he should go to trial on any other felony charges in the future"
- holding that if a state chooses to dismiss an appeal when an incompetent attorney has violated local rules, it may do so only if such action does not intrude upon the client’s due process rights, noting that "when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution — and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause”
- stating that “[t]he promise of Douglas v. California, [372 U.S. 353 (1963)] that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on his first appeal as of right — like the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335 (1963)] that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at trial — would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel”
- finding case not moot when collateral consequences of petitioner’s conviction remain, “including the possibility that the conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might give in a future proceeding and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to persistent felony offender prosecution if he should go to trial on any other felony charges in the future.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Harper v. Commonwealth, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 121 (1998)
However, Evitts, supra, is factually distinguishable in that Evitts’ counsel made a mistake which caused the appeal to be dismissed, essentially depriving Evitts of any appeal.
Distinguished by Kennedy v. State, 1989 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 38 (1989)
The Court held that Evitts was distinguishable on two grounds.
The opinion
Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
New things have so plagued the administration of criminal justice, or contributed more to lowered public confidence in *406 the courts, than the interminable appeals, the retrials, and the lack of finality.
Today, the Court, as Justice Rehnquist cogently points out, adds another barrier to finality and one that offers no real contribution to fairer justice. I join Justice Rehnquist in dissenting.