explaining that the "language in Whiteley suggests that ... [the] police could have properly arrested the defendant even though they were unaware of the specific facts that established probable cause.... In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of information concerning suspects that must be transmitted to other jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act promptly in reliance on information from another jurisdiction"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the "language in Whiteley suggests that ... [the] police could have properly arrested the defendant even though they were unaware of the specific facts that established probable cause.... In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of information concerning suspects that must be transmitted to other jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act promptly in reliance on information from another jurisdiction"
- holding that an investigative stop based on a wanted flyer or police bulletin should be upheld if (i) the officer who conducted the stop acted "in objective reliance" on the flyer or bulletin, (ii) the officer who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, and (iii) the stop that in fact occurred was not significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted by the officer who issued the bulletin
- holding that, “when evidence is uncovered during- a search incident to an arrest in reliance merely on a flyer or bulletin [issued by another law enforcement agency], its admissibility turns on whether the officers who issued the flier possessed probable cause to make the arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the flyer were themselves aware of the specific facts which led their colleagues to seek their assistance.”
- concluding that police officer may effectuate an arrest and conduct a search incident thereto on the basis of a flyer or bulletin issued by another agency, even though the bulletin did not set forth facts necessary to establish probable cause, but the legality of the arrest is determined by whether the agency issuing the bulletin had sufficient information to establish probable cause for the arrest
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Rissley, 344 Wis. 2d 422 (2012)
A careful reading of Hensley supports our conclusion that this case is distinguishable from "past
Distinguished by United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740 (2008)
469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), is similarly misplaced, as the case is readily distinguishable.
Distinguished by People v. Soun, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1499 (1995)
Hensley, supra, 469 U.S. 221, on which Soun relies for this point, is distinguishable:
Distinguished by United States v. Rodriguez, 636 F. Supp. 1522 (1986)
With regard to the issue of whether Trooper Schwartz was entitled to rely on Agent Magrames’ reasonable suspicion as conveyed in the limited radio transmission, the government contends that the facts of Hensley and Longmire are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. With respect to its effect on respondent’s “right... to be secure ... in [his] perso[n]” guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the stop in this case — although it no doubt seriously infringed upon respondent’s privacy — lasted a mere matter of moments, see ante, at 224-225, before the discovery of the gun ripened what had been merely reasonable suspicion into the full-scale probable cause necessary for an arrest. For circumstances like these, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), “defined a special category of Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210 (1979). See ante, at 228. Such a balancing test is appropriate as long as it is conducted with full *237 regard for the serious privacy interests implicated even by such a relatively nonintrusive stop. See Terry v. Ohio, supra. Of course, in the case of intrusions properly classifiable as full-scale arrests for Fourth Amendment purposes, no such balancing test is needed. Such arrests are governed by the probable-cause standard provided by the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.