holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the immigration context, except when there are “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the immigration context, except when there are “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained”
- explaining, "The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if the link between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated.”
- stating that the “body . . . of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred”
- stating that since “[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country ... various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation proceeding”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Wroblewska v. Holder, 656 F.3d 473 (2011)
468 U.S. 1032, 1040-50, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) is distinguishable — is presented in a single paragraph:
Distinguished by United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (2006)
Concluding that the Supreme Court was speaking about jurisdictional challenges under the Fourth Amendment as opposed to evidentiary challenges to tainted identity evidence, the district court held Lopez-Mendoza was inapplicable and that the case did not prohibit suppression of the statements and fingerprints.
Distinguished by Perkins v. State, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 6009 (1999)
Here, the trial judge observed that Lopez-Mendoza was distinguishable,[1] but recognized his obligation to follow the district court decisions in Ware and O'Neal.
Distinguished by Kindred v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 106 (1998)
Garrett relies heavily on a Supreme Court decision, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), which held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to administrative deportation proceedings, in part, because they are not criminal.
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
I agree with Justice White that application to this case of the mode of analysis embodied in the decisions of the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), compels the conclusion that the exclusionary rule should apply in civil deportation proceedings. Ante, at 1052-1054. However, I continue to believe that that mode of analysis fails to reflect the constitutionally mandated character of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, ante, at 931-938 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, supra, at 460 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). In my view, a sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that there is no other way to achieve “the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people — all potential victims of unlawful government conduct — that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining *1061 popular trust in government.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 357 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).