Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley

*552 Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

In the course of an election, Local 82 violated a number of the rights of respondent union members secured by Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 522 , 29 U. S. C. §401 et seq. Specifically, Local 82 restricted respondents’ ability to nominate candidates of their choice for union office in violation of § 101(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 411 (a)(1), and prevented respondents from freely expressing their views at a union nominations meeting in violation of § 101(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 411 (a)(2). After the suit was filed, the union indicated that it was willing to rerun the election which had been conducted subsequent to the tainted nominations meeting. The District Court preliminarily enjoined the union to do exactly that, exercising its authority under § 102 of the Act, which provides in pertinent part: “Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.” 29 U. S. C. §412 (emphasis supplied).

Today the Court agrees that respondents have established violations of Title I, and that the District Court had jurisdiction to fashion a remedy under § 102. However, the Court reverses the issuance of the preliminary injunction, holding that it did not constitute “appropriate relief” within the meaning of § 102. The Court so holds not because of anything in § 102 or its legislative history, but rather because of a provision in Title IV of the Act which was written long before § 102 was added to the LMRDA, and which was designed to *553 limit the remedies available in state courts, rather than the remedy a federal court may provide for a violation of Title I.

It must be conceded that there is an inconsistency between Titles I and IV of the LMRDA. While § 102 in Title I grants district courts seemingly unqualified power to grant “such relief (including injunctions), as may be appropriate,” § 403 of Title IV provides: “The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive.” 73 Stat. 534 , 29 U. S. C. § 483 . As the Court points out, the legislative history contains nothing that directly addresses this apparent inconsistency. Ante, at 542-543. I agree with the Court that the question presented by this case can be answered only by reference to the underlying purposes of the Act. Ante, at 541-542. However, I do not agree that those purposes support today’s holding.

Title I was “aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution,” Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431, 435 (1982). By securing these rights, Congress hoped to ensure unions would function in a more democratic manner. 1 We have previously construed § 102 of Title I to have a broad sweep, consistent with its broad remedial purposes. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1 (1973), we wrote: “§ 102 was intended to afford the courts ‘a wide latitude to grant relief according to the necessities of the case,’ and 'to give such relief as [the court] deems equitable under all the circumstances.’” Id., at 13 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 15548 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Elliott), and id., at 6717 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel)). Employing this broad construction of the power conferred by § 102, we then held that an award of attorney’s fees was consistent with the statute. 2

*554 The Court concedes that § 102 authorizes the issuance of limited injunctions that would not substantially delay or invalidate an election, ante, at 546. The anomaly that results is that only the most serious violations of Title I go unremedied as a result of today’s holding. It is only when a violation takes place in the midst of an election, produces the kind of irreparable injury that only an injunction can remedy, and is of a magnitude such that it taints the entire election and the results thereof, that the Court’s holding precludes a remedy. Such an approach is plainly inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of Title I.

There is no instance in which Title I rights are of greater importance, and hence the need for their effective vindication a more compelling necessity, than in the midst of an election. We wrote in Hall that “Title I of the LMRDA was specifically designed to protect the union member’s right to seek higher office within the union.” 412 U. S., at 14 . The reason for this is clear enough:

“Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision in order to promote union democracy. It recognized that democracy would be assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal. Congress also recognized that this freedom is particularly critical, and deserves vigorous protection, in the context of [union] election campaigns. For it is in elections that members can wield their power, and directly express their approval or disapproval of the union leadership.” Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U. S. 102, 112 (1982) (citations omitted).

By ensuring that Title I violations which go to the heart of the electoral process will not be effectively remedied, the majority seriously undermines the core purpose of Title I.

*555 The underlying purposes of § 403, in contrast, provide no justification for limiting the relief available under §102. Section 403 was written before Title I was added to the LMRDA on the floor of the Senate. Thus, as the majority acknowledges ante, at 542-543, there is little in Title IV’s history or purpose to suggest that it was directed at limiting the relief available under Title I. At the time § 403 was drafted and discussed, its only effect was to limit the ability of state courts to invalidate union elections; that is certainly the only purpose or policy identified in the legislative history. For example, the Senate Report states: *556 In fact, this Court has previously acknowledged this very point: “The debates reflect great concern with the proper relationship between state and federal remedies, and much less concern with the relationship between private and public enforcement.” Trbovich v. Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 534, n. 6 (1972). Thus, the policies underlying §403 are a slender reed on which to support today’s holding.

*555 “Section [4]03 of the bill specifically preserves rights and remedies which union members have under existing law to insure compliance with provisions of a union’s constitution and bylaws relating to elections prior to the conduct of an election. However, since the bill provides an effective and expeditious remedy for overthrowing an improperly held election and holding a new election, the Federal remedy is made the sole remedy and private litigation would be precluded.” S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1959). 3

*556 Moreover, what limited relevance the original intent and purpose of Title IV has is undermined by the subsequent addition of Title I on the floor of the Senate. The precise reason Title I was added to the LMRDA was because Congress concluded that Title IV did not go far enough in protecting the rights of individual union members. 4 In particular, Congress added § 102 because it felt that these rights had to be enforced through a private right of action. Finnegan, 456 U. S., at 440, n. 10 .

The original version of Title I, offered as an amendment to the LMRDA by Senator McClellan, provided that the rights contained therein would be enforced through suits brought by the Secretary of Labor. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6469-6492 (1959). The amendment passed only narrowly, with the Vice President casting the tie-breaking vote. See id., at 6493. One of the arguments made against this version of Title I by a number of Senators was that the rights it created were indi *557 vidual in nature and should be enforced through a private right of action rather than by the Secretary of Labor. 5

Three days later, Senator Kuchel offered a compromise version of Title I. He explained:

“[I]n several major points the McClellan amendment would be changed by our amendment. In one case our amendment provides for deleting from the McClellan amendment the provision for the right of the Secretary of Labor to seek an injunction when any of the rights enumerated are alleged to have been violated. In such circumstances, our amendment gives a union member who alleges such a grievance the right to go into the Federal court for appropriate relief.” Id., at 6717.

This change resulted from dissatisfaction with leaving Title I rights in the hands of the Secretary of Labor. Senator Kuchel explained:

“[H]ere is one of the major changes in the proposal. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas provided that the Secretary of Labor might, on behalf of the injured or aggrieved member, have the right to litigate the alleged grievance and to seek an injunction or other relief. We believe that giving this type of right to the aggrieved employee member himself is in the interest of justice, and therefore we propose to eliminate from the bill the right of the Secretary of Labor to sue in his behalf.” Id., at 6720.

Senator Kefauver congratulated Senator Kuchel on removing the Secretary of Labor from “the middle of the actions of every labor union in the United States,” id., at 6726, and Senator Clark noted that the new version of Title I “takes the Federal bureaucracy out of this bill of rights and leaves *558 its enforcement to union members, aided by courts,” id., at 6721. Senator Curtis said that according the individual union member a private right of action “represents the finest means by which his rights may be protected.” Id., at 6723. There are numerous other statements in the legislative history to similar effect. 6 Thus, whatever may have been its belief when Title IV was originally drafted, the legislative history of Title I demonstrates that Congress rejected reliance on the Secretary of Labor to vindicate Title I rights. Yet that is the precise effect of today’s holding — in those cases where the seriousness of the violation and the irreparability of the remedy would justify an injunction overturning the results of an election, the Court has decreed that union members’ ability to obtain a remedy for violations of their Title I rights is left to the discretion of the Secretary, a result at odds with the fundamental reason § 102 was added to the statute. 7

Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964), the case on which the majority principally relies, does not require the Court to adopt its parsimonious construction of § 102. In Calhoon , the Court began its analysis with a simple proposition: “Jurisdiction of the District Court under § 102 of Title I depends entirely upon whether this complaint showed a violation of rights guaranteed by § 101(a)(1),” id., at 138. In stating its *559 holding, the Court never mentioned §403, much less hold that it limited the scope of relief available under § 102. The Court simply held that the complaint in that case did not fall under § 102 because it challenged the eligibility requirements for union office, and “Title IV, not Title I, sets standards for eligibility and qualifications of candidates and officials,” ibid. In this case, since the Court concedes that respondents established the probable existence of violations of §101, it follows that under Calhoon there is jurisdiction to issue an “appropriate” remedy for those violations. 8

In sum, the Court’s conclusion that § 403 is a limitation on the power granted district courts in § 102 turns the statute and its legislative history on their head. The majority reads the statute as if Title IV had been added to the statute to limit the scope of Title I, when in reality the reverse is true. Congress wanted union members to be able to protect their own Title I rights rather than to rely on the Secretary of Labor. Because the Court’s holding means that the most serious violations of Title I cannot be adequately remedied except in the discretion of the Secretary, I cannot join the Court’s holding or judgment.

I recognize that in practice the question whether a new election is an appropriate remedy will not be free from difficulty. In shaping a remedy, the exercise of the district court’s discretion should be informed by the national labor policies discussed by the Court ante, at 544, n. 19, 548-549: *560 courts should be wary of unjustified or excessive interference in union elections and of the difficulties inherent in supervising an election; they should also accord due deference to the views of the Secretary of Labor. 9 However, it is unnecessary to confront any question concerning the meaning of “appropriate” relief in this case, for two reasons. First, petitioners themselves do not press the point. The questions presented in their petition for certiorari, and the thrust of their briefs, are that § 403 precluded the District Court from acting as it did. Petitioners do not argue that the District Court abused its discretion even if § 403 were not applicable here. Second, in large part petitioners stipulated to the appropriateness of the relief in the District Court, by filing stipulations indicating that they were willing to rerun the allegedly tainted election. See 521 F. Supp. 614, 618, 623 (Mass. 1981); App. 55-60, 108-110. I agree with the Court of Appeals that since the relief the District Court ultimately issued was substantially similar to what petitioners had indicated they were willing to do anyway, Judge Keeton did not abuse his discretion in fashioning a remedy. See 679 F. 2d 978 , 996-999 (CA1 1982).

Accordingly, I do not believe that the District Court failed to fashion “appropriate” relief or otherwise abused its discretion. I respectfully dissent.

See Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U. S. 102, 112 (1982); Finnegan, 456 U. S., at 435-436 ; Hall v. Cole, 412 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1973); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U. S. 492, 497-498 (1968).

“[Section] 102 of the LMRDA broadly authorizes the courts to grant ‘such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.’ 29 U. S. C. § 412 . Thus, § 102 does not ‘meticulously detail the remedies available to a *554 plaintiff,’ and we cannot fairly infer from the language ... an intent to deny to the courts the traditional equitable power to grant counsel fees in ‘appropriate’ situations.” 412 U. S., at 10 .

The other relevant statements in the legislative history concerning § 403 also focus on its pre-emptive effect with respect to state courts, see 105 Cong. Rec. 14274 (analysis of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce); id., at 7632 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 (1959) (minority views); S. Rep. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-15 (1958) (report on predecessor version of the LMRDA). The majority concludes that § 403 represents a congressional recognition that judicial intervention through suits brought by private litigants is an inappropriate way to remedy unfair elections, but the only legislative history cited by the majority in support of that conclusion is the testimony of Professor Cox, and even he refers only to pre-emption of suits in state courts. See ante, at 546-548, n. 21. See also ante, at 542, n. 19. The version of the LMRDA passed by the House provides little support for the Court’s position that Congress was opposed to private suits to overturn union elections, since not only did the House version contain a Title I which was enforced by private suits, but also under that version Title IV itself was enforced by private suits which could result in the overturning of an election. See *556 H. R. 8342, §§ 101-102, 402, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 105 Cong. Rec. 15884,15887 (1959). See also H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1959) (“A member of a labor organization who is aggrieved by any violation of these provisions . . . may bring a civil action against such labor organization in the U. S. district court for the district in which the principal office of such labor organization is located. Such action may be for the purpose of preventing and restraining such violation and for such other relief as may be appropriate, including the holding of a new election under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor and in accordance with this title”).

See Sadlowski, 457 U. S., at 109 ; 105 Cong. Rec. 6470-6474 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id., at 6476-6478; id., at 6488 (remarks of Sens. Allott and Goldwater); id., at 6490 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).

See id., at 6696 (remarks of Sen. Johnston); id., at 6486 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id., at 6485 (remarks of Sen. Morse); id., at 6483 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).

See id., at 15836 (remarks of Rep. McCormack); id., at 15689 (remarks of Rep. O’Hara); id., at 15670-15671 (remarks of Rep. Loser); id., at 15564-15565 (analysis of Rep. Foley); id., at 14989 (remarks of Sen. Morse); id., at 14345 (remarks of Rep. Landrum); id., at 10902-10903 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id., at 7023 (section-by-section analysis).

See generally Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134, 144-145 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). As I have previously observed, this result leaves the individual union member’s statutory rights subject to the Secretary of Labor’s willingness to proceed against what may be an entrenched and politically powerful union leadership. See Hodgson v. Lodge 851, International Assn, of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 454 F. 2d 545, 564 (CA7 1971) (dissenting opinion).

The majority itself explains why two of our other cases are not controlling. Statements in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 566-567 (1975), concerning the pre-emptive effect of § 403 are correctly characterized by the majority as dicta which the majority itself repudiates as too broad. Ante, at 549-550, n. 22. Similarly, the Court recognizes that Trbovich’s citation of Calhoon as standing for the proposition that “§ 403 prohibits union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election,” 404 U. S., at 531 , was an overstatement of the holding of Calhoon. Ante, at 549. Moreover, Trbovich , like Calhoon and Bachowski , involved claims properly brought under Title IV; no issue concerning the scope of § 102 was presented.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), the Secretary of Labor can intervene in Title I litigation, as he has in this case. Cf. Trbovich, 404 U. S., at 536-539 (union members may intervene in Title IV actions brought by the Secretary).