holding that the publisher’s choice of language, “though reflecting a misconception, d[id] not place the speech beyond the outer limits of the First Amendment’s broad protective umbrella” and that as a matter of law “the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that [the defendants] prepared the . . . article with knowledge that it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of the truth”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the publisher’s choice of language, “though reflecting a misconception, d[id] not place the speech beyond the outer limits of the First Amendment’s broad protective umbrella” and that as a matter of law “the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that [the defendants] prepared the . . . article with knowledge that it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of the truth”
- stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) “never forbids such an [independent] examination... indeed [the] seminal decision on the Rule expressly contemplated a review of the entire record, stating that a finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made”
- stating general principle that, in First Amendment cases, appellate courts have "an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression'" (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964))
- holding, in a product disparagement case, that where "adoption of the language chosen was `one of a number of possible rational interpretations' of an event `that bristled with ambiguities' and descriptive challenges for the writer," plaintiff could not establish actual malice
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Planned Parenthood Association/chicago Area, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation v. Chicago Transit Authority, 767 F.2d 1225 (1985)
466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), convinces us that the independent review doctrine is inapplicable to this case.
The opinion
Justice White,
dissenting.
Although I do not believe that the “reckless disregard” component of the New York Times malice standard is a question of historical fact, I agree with Justice Rehnquist that the actual-knowledge component surely is. Here, the District Court found that the defamatory statement was written with actual knowledge of falsity. The Court of Appeals thus erred in basing its disagreement with the District Court on its de novo review of the record. The majority is today equally in error. I would remand to the Court of Appeals so that it may perform its task under the proper standard.