explaining that the petitioner’s conduct “does not have the obviously unreasonable impact on purchasers that has characterized the tying arrangements that [the Supreme Court] has branded unlawful,” as “[t]here is no evidence that the price, the quality, or the supply or demand for either the ‘tying product’ or the ‘tied product’ involved in this case has been adversely affected” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the petitioner’s conduct “does not have the obviously unreasonable impact on purchasers that has characterized the tying arrangements that [the Supreme Court] has branded unlawful,” as “[t]here is no evidence that the price, the quality, or the supply or demand for either the ‘tying product’ or the ‘tied product’ involved in this case has been adversely affected” (emphasis added)
- explaining that exclusive dealing relationships “may, in some circumstances, create or extend market power of a supplier or the purchaser ... and may thus restrain horizontal competition,” but that such agreements may also be “substantially procompetitive by ensuring stable markets and encouraging long-term, [and] mutually advantageous business relationships”
- explaining that “[t]he per se rule’s direct consumer demand and indirect industry cus- tom inquiries are, as a general matter, backward-looking and therefore systemically poor proxies for overall efficiency in the presence of new and innovative integration”
- stating that a tying arrangement is not illegal unless there is enough demand for each service or product independently from the other “to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer [each service or product] separately”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) — not on the Supreme Court's list
466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. 28
Supreme Court of the United StatesMar 1, 200653 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported abrogated by statute, as recognized in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. — not on the Supreme Court's list
In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984), abrogated in part by statute as recognized in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 126 S.Ct. 1281, 164 L.Ed.2d 26 (2006) (Illinois Tool found statutory changes necessitated conclusion that fact a tying product is patented does not support presumption of market power), the United States Suprem…
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) — not on the Supreme Court's list
466 U.S. 2, 16-17, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984); abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)).
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring.
As the opinion for the Court demonstrates, we have long held that tying arrangements are subject to evaluation for per se illegality under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Whatever merit the policy arguments against this longstanding construction of the Act might have, Congress, presumably aware of our decisions, has never changed the rule by amending the Act. In such circumstances, our practice usually has been to stand by a settled statutory interpretation and leave the task of modifying the statute’s reach to Congress. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 769 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring). I see no reason to depart from that principle in this case and therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court.