holding that the exceptions to the eleventh amendment recognized in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) for suits brought against state officials are not applicable to suits based on alleged violations of state law, or designed to compel state officials “to conform their conduct to state law,” because such suits “do[ ] not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law,” and do produce “great[] intrusion[s] on state sovereignty,” and therefore would undermine “the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the exceptions to the eleventh amendment recognized in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) for suits brought against state officials are not applicable to suits based on alleged violations of state law, or designed to compel state officials “to conform their conduct to state law,” because such suits “do[ ] not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law,” and do produce “great[] intrusion[s] on state sovereignty,” and therefore would undermine “the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment”
- explaining that under Young, “[t]he Court has recognized an important exception to the general rule [that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest]: a suit challenging .the constitutionality of a state official’s action is not one against the state;” the Young■ doctrine, however, “has not been provided an expansive interpretation” in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence
- holding that “although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, we have required an unequivocal express of congressional intent to ‘overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity to the … States’” (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979))
- holding that “a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment,” and “this principle applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) — not on the Supreme Court's list
465 U.S. 89, 105-06, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds, Will, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304;
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 15, 19892 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported superseded by statute, as recognized in Joshua B. v. New Trier Township High School District 203 — not on the Supreme Court's list
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984) (“[A] suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment woirld be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.”), superseded by statute as stated in Joshua B. v. New Trier Twp. High Sch. Dis…
Distinguished
Distinguished by JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Commerce & Indus., 293 F. Supp. 3d 580 (2017)
However, as SPL correctly argues, the Fifth Circuit has noted that " Pennhurst is inapplicable when a state voluntarily waives its sovereign immunity by removing from state to federal court.
Distinguished by CENTER FOR DISEASE DETENTION, LLC v. Rullan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 136 (2003)
465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), and that the commerce clause is inapplicable to the circumstances in the case at bar.
Distinguished by Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178 (2002)
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ("We conclude that Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law"); Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295-96.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
dissenting.
I fully agree with Justice Stevens’ dissent. Nevertheless, I write separately to explain that in view of my continued belief that the Eleventh Amendment “bars federal court suits against States only by citizens of other States,” Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U. S. 983, 984 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting), I would hold that petitioners are not entitled to invoke the protections of that Amendment in this federal-court suit by citizens of Pennsylvania. See Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In my view, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), upon which the Court today relies, ante, at 98, recognized that the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, erects a limited constitutional barrier prohibiting suits against States by citizens of another State; the decision, however, “accords to nonconsenting States only a nonconstitutional immunity from suit by its own citizens.” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public *126 Health and Welfare, supra, at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For scholarly discussions supporting this view, see Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 , 1893-1894 (1983); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 , 538-540, and n. 88 (1978). To the extent that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to petitioners, I agree with Justice Stevens that since petitioners’ conduct was prohibited by state law, the protections of sovereign immunity do not extend to them.