explaining that because future dangerousness “is a constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty,” and it is “not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they should not be permitted to testify”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because future dangerousness “is a constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty,” and it is “not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they should not be permitted to testify”
- stating in the context of a federal death penalty case that “[t]he procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not legal entitlements that a defendant has a right to pursue irrespective of the contribution these procedures make toward uncovering constitutional error”
- stating that, to obtain a stay of execution, a habeas petitioner needed to show both “a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari” and “a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision”
- holding that a certificate of probable cause should only issue where petitioner has demonstrated the issues raised are (1) debatable among jurists of reason, (2) a court could resolve the issues differently, or (3) the questions presented are deserving of further proceedings.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) — not on the Supreme Court's list
See Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431-32, 111 S.Ct. 860, 112 L.Ed.2d 956 (1991); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 23, 19973 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported superseded by statute, as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel — not on the Supreme Court's list
463 U.S. 880, 899 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Slack v. McDaniel (2000) 529 U.S. 473
Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 26, 20005 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Wilson, 923 F. Supp. 2d 481 (2013)
In short, Wilson argues that Jurek and Barefoot are distinguishable because those cases involved predictions of future dangerousness about defendants who could potentially be released from prison (which he recognizes can be constitutionally considered by a capital jury), whereas his case would concern a prediction about a defendant who will never be released (which he contends cannot be reliable enough t
Distinguished by Gray v. Kelly, 180 L. Ed. 2d 879 (2011)
463 U. S. 880, 895 (1983)), that standard is inapplicable here because Gray does not seek a stay of such a judgment.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated in Parts I and II of Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, I agree that the Court of Appeals made a serious procedural error in this case. Nevertheless, since this Court has now reviewed the merits of petitioner’s appeal, and since I agree with the ultimate conclusion that the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed, I join the Court’s judgment.