explaining that because “the right claimed to have been infringed ha[d] its source in the First Amendment . . . [which] restrains only official conduct, to make out their § 1985(3) case, it was necessary for [plaintiffs] to prove that the state was somehow involved in or affected by the conspiracy”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because “the right claimed to have been infringed ha[d] its source in the First Amendment . . . [which] restrains only official conduct, to make out their § 1985(3) case, it was necessary for [plaintiffs] to prove that the state was somehow involved in or affected by the conspiracy”
- holding that animus against a class based upon its economic views, status, or activities is beyond the reach of the deprivation clause, and reserving the question whether it reaches animus against any class other than “Negroes and those who championed their cause”
- explaining that because "[t]he rights, privileges, and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere, and here the right claimed to have been infringed has its source in the First Amendment," claimant must be able to state infringement of that right
- concluding that “an 10 alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless 11 it is proved that the state is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is 12 to influence the activity of the state.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Piacentini v. Levangie, 998 F. Supp. 86 (1998)
463 U.S. 825, 834-38, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983)(economic and commercial animus is inapplicable).
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
The Ku Klux Klan Act was the Reconstruction Congress’ response to politically motivated mob violence in the post-bellum South designed to intimidate persons in the exercise of their legal rights. While § 1 of the Act prohibits state officials from violating the federal rights of citizens, § 2 addresses the problem of mob violence directly. 1 It provides *840 criminal and civil liability for private conspiracies to deprive “either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” Act of Apr. 20, 1871, §2, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U. S. C. §1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. V)). Today, in a classic case of mob violence intended to intimidate persons from exercising their legal rights, the Court holds that the Ku Klux Klan Act provides no protection.
I
The Court first holds that § 1985(3) prohibits a private conspiracy to interfere with the exercise of First Amendment rights only if some state action is involved. 2 Ante, at 830-834. The Court assumes that § 1985(3) merely bans private conspiracies to accomplish deprivations that are actionable under §1983 when caused by state officials. Although Congress could have passed such a statute, the simple fact is that it did not.
A
On its face, §1985(3) differs structurally from §1983. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 336-337 (1983); id., at 356 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 99 (1971). Unlike § 1983, § 1985(3) does not provide a cause of action for the deprivation of independent rights “secured by the Constitution and laws.” Instead, it prohibits private conspiracies intended to prevent persons or classes of persons from the equal exercise of any of their *841 civil rights. No violation of an independent legal right is required; nor does §1985(3) require state action or the involvement of the State in any other way.
The legislative history unambiguously establishes the meaning and function of the “equal protection” and “equal privileges and immunities” language in § 1985(3). 3 As originally introduced by Representative Shellabarger, § 2 did not contain these terms. Instead, it imposed federal criminal liability on private conspiracies to commit certain enumerated actions that would be federal crimes if committed in an enclave subject to United States jurisdiction. 4 In support of his bill, the Congressman argued that Congress had constitutional authority to legislate against private action in order to protect and secure the rights of national citizenship. Refer *842 ring to Justice Washington’s statement of national privileges and immunities in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa. 1825), Shellabarger stated that §2 “punishes, not individual crime, but only banded, mastering, confederated violence. Then also it must be directed against the rights, privileges, or immunities of a citizen.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 69 (Mar. 28, 1871).
In the debate that followed, radical Republicans supported the bill on a broader ground. They asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment had altered the balance between the States and the National Government so that Congress now was permitted to protect life, liberty, and property by legislating directly against criminal activity. 5 From the beginning of the debate, Democratic and other opponents of the bill saw the radical imprimatur on §2 and argued that it exceeded congressional authority by extending federal jurisdiction to cover common crimes. 6 Republicans of more moderate persuasion also refused to support §2 as proposed, fearing that it reflected the radical view.
Unlike the Democrats, however, the moderate Republicans agreed with Shellabarger that Congress had authority to reach private conduct by virtue of its power to protect the rights of national citizenship. They believed that Fourteenth Amendment rights were possessed by persons regardless of the presence of state action. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id., at 486 (Apr. 5, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Cook); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 673 (1978). The dispute within the Republican majority centered on whether the bill itself was limited to *843 this purpose, or instead whether it did or should usurp state authority over local and individual crimes.
Although individual views among the moderates differed, 7 the extensive remarks of Representative Garfield summarized their position well. See R. Harris, The Quest for Equality 47 (1960). Garfield did not believe that Congress had the power to displace the criminal jurisdiction of the States. In his view, however, the Fourteenth Amendment provided citizens with an affirmative and congressionally enforceable right to equal protection of the laws: “the provision that the States shall not ‘deny the equal protection of the laws’ implies that they shall afford equal protection.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871). When the States neglect or refuse to provide equal protection, “it is undoubtedly within the power of Congress to provide by law for the punishment of all persons, official or private, who shall invade these rights [guaranteed by the Civil War Amendments], and who by violence, threats, or intimidation shall deprive any citizen of their fullest enjoyment.” Ibid.
Garfield’s theory of the Fourteenth Amendment was that the right of equal protection of the laws as well as other rights were rights of national citizenship guaranteed directly to the people. They existed independently of any state action. He disagreed with the radicals about the circumstances under which Congress could step in to protect those rights. He stated:
“[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even where the laws are just and *844 equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state of facts is clearly made out, I believe the last clause of the first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those persons who are thus denied equal protection.” Ibid.
Garfield concluded by stating that he could support the bill if § 2 was amended to reflect this view. Ibid.
Because the moderates held the balance of power, see Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 402 , 412, n. 47 (1979), some amendment was necessary. The day after Garfield’s speech, Shellabarger introduced a new §2. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (Apr. 5, 1871). The amendment removed the list of actionable crimes and added a civil cause of action for persons injured by the conspiracy. It also added the critical language that imposed liability on persons who “conspire together for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws.” 8 Ibid. According to Shellabarger:
*845 “The object of the amendment is ... to confine the authority of this law to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens’ rights shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section.” Id., at 478.
Representative Willard — who opposed the original version and claimed to have drafted the amendment — stated that
“the essence of the crime should consist in the intent to deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; in other words, that the Constitution secured, and was only intended to secure, equality of rights and immunities, and that we could only punish by United States laws a denial of that equality.” Id., at App. 188 (Apr. 6,1871).
Although these are the only two statements that bear directly on the clause at issue, other Representatives generally approved of the amendment because it avoided the evil of imposing a federal criminal law on the States. 9 As *846 amended, this bill was adopted by the House on April 6. Id., at 522.
The Senate considered the House bill for only three days, and with a few limited changes, adopted it on April 14. Id., at 709. In explaining the scope of §2, Senator Edmunds expressed the view that it included conspiracies to “overthrow the Government, conspiracies to impede the course of justice, conspiracies to deprive people of the equal protection of the laws, whatever those laws may be.” Id., at 568 (Apr. 11, 1871). Senator Pool expressed his support by remarking that the Fourteenth Amendment had conferred a new right on every citizen — the right to protection of the laws. Id., at 608 (Apr. 12, 1871).
Throughout the debates on §2, the Republican majority agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred rights, including the right to equal protection of the laws, directly on persons and that those rights could be violated by private conspirators. The debate was over the conditions under which the Federal Government could step in to assert jurisdiction to protect those rights — a separate constitutional *847 question of federal-state comity — not over the nature of the rights themselves. By limiting § 2 to deprivations of equal protection and of equal privileges and immunities, the 42d Congress avoided the constitutional problems the more moderate Republicans saw in the creation of a general federal criminal law. The effect of that language was to limit federal jurisdiction to cases in which persons were the victims of private conspiracies motivated by the intent to interfere in the equal exercise and enjoyment of their legal rights. 10 Congress did not intend any requirement of state involvement in either a civil or criminal action under § 2.
B
Consistent with this view, the Court has held on several occasions that §2 reaches purely private conspiracies. In United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883), the Court construed § 2 to prohibit a private conspiracy to deprive certain persons of equal protection by removing them from jail by force and lynching them. Section 2, it stated, applies “no matter how well the State may have performed its duty. Under it private persons are liable to punishment for conspir *848 ing to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State.” 11 Id., at 639; cf. United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70, 76 (1951) (plurality opinion) (similar conspiracy provision, 18 U. S. C. §241 , reaches private action).
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651 (1951), arose from a political brawl between two white groups. The complaint alleged a § 1985(3) conspiracy to hinder the plaintiffs’ equal enjoyment of their First Amendment rights. Id., at 653-654. The Court noted possible constitutional problems with imposing civil liability for this type of activity, id., at 659, but passed over the issue. Id., at 661. Instead, it found that the alleged conspiracy was not one prohibited by the statute because there was no “allegation that defendants were conscious of or trying to influence the law.” Ibid. The Collins decision thus suggested a requirement of state involvement virtually identical to that adopted by the Court today.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971), however, put this suggested requirement to rest. In a unanimous decision, the Court stated that the evolution of the law had washed away the constitutional concerns of Collins , and that there was no reason “not to accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning.” 12 403 U. S., at 96 . The Court expressly rejected a requirement of state involvement in the *849 form of an intent to interfere with state officials. 13 Id., at 99 ; see Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1721 , 1730 (1977) (state involvement requirement is incompatible with Griffin). It then reviewed the legislative history to find that the only statutory limitation on the broad sweep of § 1985(3) was a requirement of “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” 403 U. S., at 102 ; see id., at 99-102 .
As Griffin held, the “equal protection of the laws” and the “equal privileges and immunities” language in § 1985(3) was intended by the 42d Congress to prevent the statute from creating a general federal criminal or tort law. It was not intended to impose a state-action or state-involvement requirement on actions under the statute. Properly interpreted, § 1985(3) prohibits private conspiracies designed to interfere with persons’ equal enjoyment and exercise of their civil rights even if those conspiracies have no state involvement of any kind. 14
II
As Griffin recognized, the words “equal protection of the laws” and “equal privileges and immunities” limit the types of *850 actionable private conspiracies to those involving class-based animus. As an initial matter, the intended victims must be victims not because of any personal malice the conspirators have toward them, but because of their membership in or affiliation with a particular class. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 702 (Apr. 14, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); see id., at 567 (Apr. 11, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Moreover, the class must exist independently of the defendants’ actions; that is, it cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action. See Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F. 2d 673, 678 (CA7 1976); Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F. 2d 924, 928 (CA9 1975).
A
Aside from this initial rule of exclusion, however, the types of classes covered by the statute are far from clear. The statutory language is broad and could include a wide variety of class-based denials of equal protection and equal enjoyment of rights; yet it is also indefinite, and in Griffin , the Court reserved the question whether nonracial classes are covered. 403 U. S., at 102 . The legislative history provides little assistance, probably because the congressional majority had little disagreement on the need to halt con-spirational Klan violence and was far more concerned with its constitutional authority to criminalize such conspiracies.
The general statements of the Act’s purpose give some indication of the breadth of the remedy Congress provided. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 835-837, the 42d Congress viewed the Ku Klux Klan as pre-eminently a political organization, whose violence was thought to be premised most often on the political viewpoints of its victims. 15 “They *851 murder men in their own houses for a difference in political opinions and defy the laws which denounce these acts.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 72 (Mar. 30, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Blair); see id., at 391 (Apr. 1, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Elliott). Moreover, as the legislative history surveyed above reveals, Congress recognized that this violence could fester because the general opposition to Reconstruction policies in the South rendered local law enforcement authorities less likely to protect the rights of persons affiliated in any way with those policies.
In my view, Congress intended to provide a federal remedy for all classes that seek to exercise their legal rights in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence. Instead of contemplating a list of actionable class traits, though, Congress had in mind a functional definition of the scope of § 2. As Representative Garfield stated in the debates, the chief danger was “a systematic maladministration of [the laws], or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions.” Id., at App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871). Congress did not require that a § 2 plaintiff allege a neglect on the part of state officers to enforce the laws equally. Instead, it took the view that whenever a conspiracy involved invidious animus toward a class of persons, the possibility of ineffective state enforcement was sufficient to support federal intervention. 16 Id., at 485 (Apr. 5, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Cook).
*852 B
This view of the scope of § 2 is corroborated by congressional statements of concern for another group subject to Klan violence: economic migrants. While the Klan’s victims usually were Republicans, Congress extended protection to this group because of its tenuous position in the South. Reconstruction, although mainly a political program, see J. Randall & D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction 592-600 (2d ed. 1961), also was an attempt to reorganize the economic life of the region. W. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 345-353 (1962). Particularly irritating to the poorer Southerners who supported the Ku Klux Klan was the new competition in the labor market from Negroes. Id., at 19; Randall & Donald, swpra, at 684. Moreover, carpetbaggers from the North moved into the South to seek their fortunes as well as to make new lives. C. Woodward, Reunion and Reaction 52-57 (1966).
Many of the Democratic opponents of the Act saw the Act’s protection of Negroes and carpetbaggers as just another facet of the Reconstruction policies of economic exploitation. 17 Republican supporters of the bill also recognized the economic features of Reconstruction. They, however, saw the Klan terrorism as directed at the legitimate economic activities of those who migrated to the South to better them *853 selves. 18 Representative Kelley was the most explicit: he interpreted the Klan problem as essentially one of Southern resistance to economic migrations of Northerners. Id., at 338-339, 341 (Mar. 29, 1871). 19
C
The 42d Congress was concerned about these economic migrants because of their vulnerability as symbols and effects of Reconstruction policies. Congress’ answer to the problem of Klan violence — a problem with political, racial, and economic overtones — was to create a general federal remedy to protect classes of people from private conspiracies aimed at interfering with the class members’ equal exercise of their civil rights. The critical consideration is the 42d Congress’ perception that the atrocities perpetrated by the Klan were injuring persons who, largely because of their political affiliation, were unable to demand protection from local law enforcement officials. Congress intended to provide a remedy to any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from local authorities. While certain class traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin, per se meet this requirement, other traits also may implicate the functional concerns in particular situations.
H-t H-1 hH
In the circumstances of this case, respondents are protected by §2 and fall within this definition. Port Arthur, *854 Tex., was a self-professed union town. Respondents were threatened because of petitioners’ view that nonunion workers were encroaching into an area that petitioners desired to keep union dominated. The identity or individuality of each of the victims was irrelevant to the conspiracy; the victims were attacked because of their pre-existing nonunion association. The conspiracy was similar to the Klan conspiracies Congress desired to punish in enacting §2. In this union town, the effectiveness of local law enforcement protection for nonunion workers was open to question. 20 Petitioners intended to hinder a particular group in the exercise of their legal rights because of their membership in a specific class.
I — I <
In Griffin v. Breckenridge , we reaffirmed our general approach to Reconstruction civil rights statutes including § 1985(3). Those statutes are to be given “ ‘a sweep as broad as [their] language.’” 403 U. S., at 97 , quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801 (1966). In the 12 years since Griffin , that principle has not lost its vitality. I see no basis for the Court’s crabbed and uninformed reading of the words of § 1985(3). I dissent.
Section 1 of the Act is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Section 2, in addition to the prohibition at issue here (now codified in § 1985(3), first clause), prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the performance of duties by federal officers (§ 1985(1)), with the administra *840 tion of federal courts (§ 1985(2), first part), with the administration of state courts, (§ 1985(2), second part), with the duties of a state officer (§ 1985(3), second clause), and with the right to support candidates in a federal election (§ 1985(3), third clause). See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U. S. 719, 724 (1983). See generally Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 336, n. 17 (1983) (describing §§ 3-6).
The Court does not require that the conspirators be state officials or act under color of state law. Instead, the requirement is that the conspiracy intend to cause the State or a person acting under color of state law to deprive the victims of the conspiracy of their constitutional rights.
The Court’s misinterpretation of the language of the statute is compounded by the Court’s subtle confusion of statutory construction with constitutional interpretation. As Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971), established and the Court seemingly recognizes, see ante, at 832-833, the two questions are separate. Determining the scope of § 1985(3) is a matter of statutory construction and has nothing to do with current interpretations of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. The 42d Congress’ view of its constitutional authority in 1871 to reach private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant in interpreting the reach of § 1985(3).
The original version of § 2 provided:
“That if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band or conspire together to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person, which, being committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to or engaged in said conspiracy, whether principals or accessories [sic], shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be liable, &c., and the crime shall be punishable as such in the courts of the United States.” Gong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68-69 (Mar. 28,1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger), quoting H. R. 320, §2, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 73 (Mar. 30, 1871) (remarks of Rep. A. Blair); id., at App. 86 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id., at App. 141 (Apr. 3, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Shanks).
See, e. g., id., at 337 (Mar. 29, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 361 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Swan); id., at 366 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id., at 373 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Archer).
Representative Farnsworth, for example, took the more conservative view that Congress could not punish individuals under the Equal Protection Clause, but could only prohibit unequal state legislation. Id., at 115 (Mar. 31, 1871). He ultimately voted for the Act. Id., at 522 (Apr. 6, 1871). Other Republicans held the belief that Congress could punish individuals only when their conspiracy intended to obstruct a state official’s duty to provide equal protection of the laws. See Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 402 , 414-415 (1979). The bill as passed, however, was not limited by either type of restriction.
Immediately following this clause in the amendment were two other proposed clauses using similar equal protection language. The first prohibited a conspiracy “for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of the laws.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (Apr. 5, 1871). This clause is now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3), second clause, see n. 1, supra, and clearly requires some state involvement.
The second clause prohibited a conspiracy “to injure any person in his person or his property for lawfully enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (Apr. 5, 1871). An amendment in the Senate added to this last clause the prohibition of a conspiracy “for the purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen of the *845 United States the due and equal protection of the laws.” Id., at 702 (Apr. 14, 1871). This clause as amended is now codified in the second part of § 1985(2).
For example, Representative Cook, who had opposed the original version and who had introduced similar amendments, see id., at 478 (Apr. 5, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger), stated that the amendment did not provide for federal punishment of “an assault and battery when committed by two or more persons within a State.” Id., at 485 (Apr. 5, 1871).
“The proposition we maintain is that wherever the Constitution of the United States secures a right to a citizen Congress may enforce and protect that right. One absolute test is this: Congress may legislate to protect any right the denial of which by a State court would give the citizen affected thereby a right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States for redress.... I do not care what that right is, so it is a right which is secured by the Constitution of the United States, either by an affirmative or a negative provision. Whether a right secured by the Constitution touches *846 the person of a citizen, that right may be protected by the national laws.” Ibid.
However, Representative Burchard, who shared with Farnsworth a more limited view of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, see n. 7, supra, stated in general terms that “[t]he gravamen of the offense is the unlawful attempt to prevent a State through its officers enforcing in behalf of a citizen of the United States his constitutional right to equality of protection.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 316 (Apr. 6, 1871). Shortly thereafter, Representative Farnsworth restated his view, see n. 7, supra, and attempted to amend the clause immediately following the one at issue to limit its scope to federal officers. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 513 (Apr. 6, 1871). After a lengthy colloquy with Representative Poland, id., at 512-514, Farnsworth dropped his amendment. Id., at 515. In any event, Burchard agreed with Cook that the “amendment obviates in a great measure the objections and the doubtful construction as to the extent of jurisdiction for the punishment of crimes intended by the bill. It is not denial of protection, but of equality of protection, which constitutes the offense against the United States.” Id., at App. 315 (Apr. 6, 1871).
The Court in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366, 372, 376 (1979), stated that § 1985(3) is a remedial statute and provides no substantive rights. The 42d Congress also believed it was providing a remedy, see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (Mar. 28, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) — a remedy for violations of the right to equal protection which it believed was guaranteed against both state and private action. To the extent that the language of § 2 incorporated that interpretation of the scope of the right, it is not strictly remedial from the current perspective on constitutional law. Moreover, like other conspiracy statutes, § 1985(3) “is best viewed as a unique provision for which a remedial versus substantive characterization is misplaced.” Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: The Scope of Section 1985(3) After Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny , 61 B. U. L. Rev. 1007, 1021 (1981). The Novotny Court’s statements were accurate, if unnecessary, in the context of the issue in that case, but should not be given independent significance. The Court, however, employs them in summary fashion to dispose of the statutory construction question without real analysis of the issue. Ante, at 833.
Although the indictment was valid under the statute, 106 U. S., at 639 , the Court found no constitutional authorization for the criminal prohibition of §2 under the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at 638-640, citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 642 (1876), under the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 106 U. S., at 637, 640-643 , or under Art. 4, §2, id., at 643.
As the Court notes, ante, at 832, the Griffin court stated:
“A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has . . . made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons. Yet there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State.” 403 U. S., at 97 .
This implicitly recognizes that the Members of the 42d Congress believed that the right to equal protection of the laws could be violated by private action.
This form of state action is covered by the second clause of § 1985(3), which imposes liability for hindering a state officer in providing equal protection. 403 U. S., at 99 ; see nn. 1 and 10, supra. The Court today asserts that Griffin rejected a general requirement that the conspiracy itself involve state action, but did not reject specifically the requirement of state involvement when the constitutional right implicated is one against state action. See n. 2, supra. The Court, however, simply ignores the fact that we also rejected the latter type of requirement as a matter of statutory construction, see 403 U. S., at 99 , and arrives at a contradictory construction by imposing the constitutional interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the statute. See n. 3, supra.
The Constitution poses no obstacle to this exercise of congressional power. The Court correctly recognizes that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to ban such conspiracies. Ante, at 833; see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 257-258 (1964).
The Elan’s goal was to overthrow Republican Reconstruction policies both by terrorizing local supporters of those policies in order to place sympathetic Democrats in office, and when that failed by supplanting the authority of local officials directly with mob violence. See Comment, 46 *851 U. CM. L. Rev., at 408-410. Although Negroes frequently were the objects of this terrorism, they were simply one symbol of the hated Reconstruction policies. According to Senator Pool, “[t]he real question is whether the reconstruction policy of Congress, which was adopted after the close of war and announced as necessary to the future peace and security of this nation, shall be carried into practical effect, or whether it shall practically be nullified by local violence.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 101 (Mar. 31, 1871); see id., at 333 (Mar. 29, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 390-391 (Apr. 1, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Elliot); id., at App. 252-253 (Apr. 4, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Morton).
That vulnerability is a factor is indicated by Representative Roberts’ description of the distribution of mob violence: “Take the political census of *852 the States lately in rebellion by districts. Mark those which are strongly Republican and those which are decidedly Democratic. In neither of them will you find systematic assaults upon citizens. The districts which are politically doubtful are scarlet with human gore.” Id., at 413 (Apr. 3, 1871); see id., at 607 (Apr. 12, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Pool). Senator Edmunds’ frequently quoted remark about Democrats, Vermonters, Catholics, and Methodists, id., at 567 (Apr. 11, 1871), quoted ante, at 837, indicates classes that in particular circumstances or in geographic regions might qualify for protection because of their vulnerability.
Representative Swan viewed Reconstruction simply as opening the South to economic exploitation by Northerners under the pretext of aiding Negroes. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 362 (Mar. 31, 1871); see id., at 354 (Mar. 30, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Beck).
See id., at 368 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Sheldon) (right of persons to migrate and engage in legitimate traffic); id., at 414 (Apr. 1, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Roberts) (“The carpet-bag is a sign of the vitality of our people”); id., at 500 (Apr. 6, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) (Constitution protects migration of workers).
See id., at 653 (Apr. 13, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Osborn) (violence harms men who have migrated to the South for economic reasons). Senator Morton echoed this theme, stating that the purpose of Klan violence was to drive out Republicans; this effectively barred Northern capital and immigration. Id., at App. 252 (Apr. 4, 1871).
Although it is not necessary to plead ineffectiveness of local law enforcement in order to maintain a § 1985(3) action, some victims of the Port Arthur incident experienced difficulty in obtaining an injunction from a state court against future episodes of violence. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.