Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City

Justice Powell,

with whom The Chief Justice joins, and with whom Justice Rehnquist joins as to Part II, concurring in the judgment.

With reluctance, I write separately. The many opinions filed in this case draw lines that are not required by, and *608 indeed in some instances seem incompatible with, our prior decisions. Our opinions today will further confuse rather than guide. 1

I

In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting), I would have held that Congress intended no implied private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. For the same general reasons, I also would hold that petitioners may not maintain this action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Congress, for reasons of its own, all too frequently elects to remain silent on the private right-of-action question. The *609 result frequently is uncertainty and litigation as to available remedies, leaving the courts to provide an answer without clear legislative guidance. We have recognized repeatedly that whether a private right of action may be implied requires a determination of congressional intent. See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 20-23 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look, of course, to the legislative history, and in particular to what other remedies have been provided. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19 (1979) (“it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it”).

The legislative history of Title VI is replete with references to the Act’s central purpose of ensuring that taxpayers’ money be spent nondiscriminatorily. See ante, at 599 (opinion of White, J.). In accord with this purpose, Congress expressly provided for perhaps the most effective of all remedies in a federal funding statute: the cutting off of funds. 2 In addition, it created a carefully constructed ad *610 ministrative procedure to ensure that such withholding of funds is ordered only where appropriate. In light of these factors, I do not believe that Congress intended to authorize private suits but failed to do so through some inadvertence. See also University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 381 (1978) (opinion of White, J.) (“[T]here is no express provision for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, intended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce Title VI”)- 3 I would affirm the judgment below solely on this issue.

H — I > — I

There is, however, an alternative ground for affirmance. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that petitioners had failed to show any intentional discrimination. The Court of Appeals, relying on the opinions in Bakke , held that such a showing — one that must be made to establish an equal protection claim — is a prerequisite to a successful Title VI claim. I agree with Justice Stevens, post, at 639-642, that the Court of Appeals was correct in its reading of our opinions in Bakke .

My conclusion in Bakke was that “[i]n view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.” 438 U. S., at 287 . Jus *611 tices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun undertook a thorough analysis of the legislative history in reaching the same conclusion. See id., at 328-340 . They concluded “that Title VTs definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution’s.” Id., at 352 . This construction necessarily requires rejection of the prior decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), that discriminatory impact suffices to establish liability under Title VI. 4 In my view, the Court of Appeals therefore was fully justified in holding that petitioners failed to establish their Title VI claims. 5

For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s judgment.

In particular, the Court is divided as to the standard of proof required to prove violations of rights in cases involving Title VI. Seven Members of the Court agree that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. See infra, at 610-611; post, at 612 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment); post, at 612, and n. 1 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); post, at 641-642 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.) (“Today, proof of invidious purpose is a necessary component of a valid Title VI claim”). Only Justices White and Marshall believe that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory effect, and Justice White would recognize only non-compensatory, prospective relief for such a violation. See ante, at 602-604. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, however, believe that a violation of the regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory impact. See post, at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Thus, a majority of the Court would hold that proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability only when the suit is brought to enforce the regulations rather than the statute itself. And it would seem that the regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ; anyone invoking the implied right of action under Title VI would be limited by the discriminatory-intent standard required to prove violations of Title VI. Thus, the apparent result is that a suit against governmental recipients of federal funds — who may be sued under § 1983 — will be governed by a different standard of liability than a suit against private recipients of federal funds. One would have difficulty explaining this result in terms of the legislative history of Title VI.

Justice Marshall argues that private relief must be available because the statutory remedy of a fund cutoff is “impractical” and “too Draconian to be widely used.” Post, at 626-627 (dissenting opinion). See post, at 638, n. 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In my view, such reasoning evinces a departure from the principle that legislative intent is the guide to implying a right of action. The judiciary is not free to decide that remedies affirmatively and expressly adopted by Congress are so “impractical” or “Draconian” that judicially created remedies are necessary. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law”). Rather, Congress’ express adoption of one remedy — and one only — should be viewed as a congressional choice that should be obeyed. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mechanism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially reluctant ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes”).

I also would hold that private actions asserting violations of Title VI may not be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 . Congress’ creation of an express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly suggests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately either under the statute itself or under § 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 463 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1981); cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 22, n. 11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (an exception to § 1983 liability is “where the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms”).

The Lau Court did not undertake any analysis of the legislative history of Title VI, reaching its conclusion essentially without supporting reasoning. I have no occasion here to consider whether the result in Lau may stand despite rejection of its assumed premise.

For the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor, post, at 612-615, I reject Justice Stevens’ novel argument that an administrative agency is free to adopt any regulation that may be said to further the purposes of an enabling statute. Administrative agencies do not have — and should not have — such lawmaking power.

Justices White and Marshall would avoid the explicit reasoning of Bakke by deferring to a prior administrative construction of Title VI. See ante, at 592-593 (opinion of White, J.); post, at 617-623 (Marshall, J., dissenting). I do not question the view that the Court should “sustain] a reasonable administrative interpretation even if we would have reached a different result had the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Post, at 621 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But I know of no precedent whatever for asserting that this deference to administrative interpretation is proper after this Court already has issued a definitive — and contrary— construction of its own. Moreover, in Bakke Justices White and Marshall agreed that “[njowhere is there any suggestion that Title VI was intended to terminate federal funding for any reason other than consideration of race or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner inconsistent with the standards incorporated in the Constitution.” 438 U. S., at 332 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). If “nowhere” is there any evidence that Congress intended the Title VI standard to differ from the constitutional standard, clearly an agency interpretation to the contrary is entitled to no deference.