holding "that when a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of the crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.”
How later courts described this case
- holding "that when a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of the crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.”
- holding that "when a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government ... to confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society"
- recognizing that the “statutory scheme for commitment of insane criminals is . . . a regula- tory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmen- tal interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that a person acquitted as not guilty by reason of insanity may be committed until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society and that his confinement is not constitutionally limited by the maximum sentence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Field, 118 Wis. 2d 269 (1984)
The defendant responded to the state’s arguments concerning the applicability of Jones to Kovach, arguing that the holding in Kovach is distinguishable from Jones, and that “Even assuming that guarantees of the federal constitution may be elucidated by reference to Jones . . . , this Court in . . .
Distinguished by State v. Pruitt, 18 Ohio App. 3d 50 (1984)
(1983), _ U.S. _, 77 L.Ed. 2d 694, is inapposite to the present case.
The opinion
*387 Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
The character of the conduct that causes a person to be incarcerated in an institution is relevant to the length of his permissible detention. In my opinion, a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, like a plea of guilty, may provide a sufficient basis for confinement for the period fixed by the legislature as punishment for the acknowledged conduct, provided of course that the acquittee is given a fair opportunity to prove that he has recovered from his illness. But surely if he is to be confined for a longer period, the State must shoulder the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that such additional confinement is appropriate. As Justice Brennan demonstrates, that result is dictated by our prior cases. What Justice Powell has written lends support to the view that the initial confinement of the acquittee is permissible, but provides no support for the conclusion that he has the burden of proving his entitlement to freedom after he has served the maximum sentence authorized by law. I respectfully dissent because I believe this shoplifter was presumptively entitled to his freedom after he had been incarcerated for a period of one year.