Opinion

Nevada v. United States

  • 463 U.S. 110
  • 51 U.S.L.W. 4974
  • 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20704
  • 103 S. Ct. 2906
  • 77 L. Ed. 2d 509
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 24, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Brennan
On the bench
Rehnquist, Brennan
Cited by
529 cases

explaining that res judicata applies “not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered USCA11 Case: 25-11532 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2026 Page: 8 of 11 8 Opinion of the Court 25-11532 for that purpose” (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876))

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that res judicata applies “not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered USCA11 Case: 25-11532 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/26/2026 Page: 8 of 11 8 Opinion of the Court 25-11532 for that purpose” (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876))
  • ruling that “when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, it is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered ..., but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered”
  • explaining that the United States, in arguing that it could reallocate the water to a different use, had overlooked “the obligations that necessarily devolve upon it from having mere title to water rights for the Newlands Project, when the beneficial ownership of these water rights resides elsewhere”
  • explaining that “the beneficial interest in the [water] rights confirmed to the Government resided in the owners of the land within the [reclamation] Project to which these waters became appurtenant upon the application of Project water to the land”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice Brennan,

concurring.

The mere existence of a formal “conflict of interest” does not deprive the United States of authority to represent Indians in litigation, and therefore to bind them as well. If, however, the United States actually causes harm through a breach of its trust obligations the Indians should have a remedy against it. I join the Court’s opinion on the understanding that it reaffirms that the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe has a remedy against the United States for the breach of duty that the United States has admitted. See ante, at 144, n. 16.

In the final analysis, our decision today is that thousands of small farmers in northwestern Nevada can rely on specific promises made to their forebears two and three generations ago, and solemnized in a judicial decree, despite strong claims on the part of the Pyramid Lake Paiutes. The availability of water determines the character of life and culture in this region. Here, as elsewhere in the West, it is insufficient to satisfy all claims. In the face of such fundamental natural limitations, the rule of law cannot avert large measures of loss, destruction, and profound disappointment, no matter *146 how scrupulously evenhanded are the law’s doctrines and administration. Yet the law can and should fix responsibility for loss and destruction that should have been avoided, and it can and should require that those whose rights are appropriated for the benefit of others receive appropriate compensation. *

I also note that the District Court found that one of the purposes for establishment of the Pyramid Lake Reservation was “to provide the Indians with access to Pyramid Lake ... in order that they might obtain their sustenance, at least in part, from these historic fisheries.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 81-2245, p. 183a. As a consequence, the Tribe retains a Winters right, at least in theory, to water to maintain the fishery, a right which today’s ruling does not question. To some extent it may be possible to satisfy the Tribe’s claims consistent with the Orr Ditch decree — for instance, through judicious management of the Derby Dam and Lahontan Reservoir, improvement of the quality of the Newlands Project irrigation works, application of heretofore unappropriated floodwaters, or invocation of the decree’s provisions for restricting diversions in excess of those allowed by the decree.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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