finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s general jurisdictional grant to decide cases arising under the Constitution not only grants federal courts the authority to decide whether a constitutional -10- Case No. 1:08-CV-1902 Gwin, J. violation occurred, “but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.” (citing Hood, 327 U.S. at 684 )
How later courts described this case
- finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s general jurisdictional grant to decide cases arising under the Constitution not only grants federal courts the authority to decide whether a constitutional -10- Case No. 1:08-CV-1902 Gwin, J. violation occurred, “but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.” (citing Hood, 327 U.S. at 684 )
- recognizing that the Supreme Court has generally been hesitant to imply a damages remedy not explicitly provided by Congress where such a remedy would interfere with other branches of government (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947), and United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 74 S.Ct. 695, 98 L.Ed. 898 (1954))
- finding a Bivens attacked and not just beat up.” When [Plaintiff] filed his FTCA lawsuit, he claimed that Captain Fitzgerald followed through with her threats and placed him in the Special Housing Unit.” ECF No. 68 at PageID #: 504 (citing ECF No. 47 at PageID #: 275). 23 (4:10cv2404) action was foreclosed because the plaintiff had “meaningful remedies”
- holding that where “claims arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United States, ... it would be inappropriate ... to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Townsel v. Jamerson, 240 F. Supp. 3d 894 (2017)
that, because he is not seeking redress for an employment action, Lucas is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Brothers v. Custis, 886 F.2d 1282 (1989)
Dr. Brothers argues that Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) is distinguishable on the grounds that Bush was an established government employee who was within the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection Board, an agency which could grant him meaningful relief, and that such is not true in Dr. Brothers' case.
Distinguished by American Federation of Government Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (1986)
462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Frank K. Kotarski v. V.L. Cooper, A.E. Navarro, W.J. Tinston, J.H. Kirkpatrick, Naval Air Rework Facility, Capt. P.A. Monroe, in His Official Capacity, 799 F.2d 1342 (1986)
Kotarski contends that Bush is inapplicable to his case because the employee in Bush was fully tenured and entitled to all of the protections of the civil service system.
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that there are “special factors counselling-hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 396 (1971). I write separately only to emphasize that in my view a different case would be presented if Congress had not created a comprehensive scheme that was specifically designed to provide full compensation to civil service employees who are discharged or disciplined in violation of their First Amendment rights, cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23 (1980); Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F. 2d 904, 907 (CA7 1981), and that affords a remedy that is substantially as effective as a damages action.
Although petitioner may be correct that the administrative procedure created by Congress, unlike a Bivens action, * does *391 not permit recovery for loss due to emotional distress and mental anguish, Congress plainly intended to provide what it regarded as full compensatory relief when it enacted the Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U. S. C. § 5596 (1982 ed.). The Act was designed to “pu[t] the employee in the same position he would have been in had the unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place.” See S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966). See H. R. Rep. No. 32, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1965); cf. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 82-83 (1974). Moreover, there is nothing in today's decision to foreclose a federal employee from pursuing a Bivens remedy where his injury is not attributable to personnel actions which may be remedied under the federal statutory scheme.
I cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that civil service remedies are substantially less effective than an individual damages remedy. See ante, at 372. To begin with, the procedure provided by the civil service scheme is in many respects preferable to the judicial procedure under a Bivens action. See Brief for Respondent 18-21. For example, the burden of proof in an action before the Civil Service Commission (now the Merit Systems Protection Board) must be borne by the agency, rather than by the discharged employee. See Civil Service Commission, Conducting Hearings on Employee Appeals 11 (1968); cf. Finfer v. Caplin, 344 F. 2d 38, 41 (CA2), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 883 (1965); Pelicone v. Hodges, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 34, 320 F. 2d 754, 756 (1963). Moreover, the employee is not required to overcome the qualified immunity of executive officials as he might be required to in a suit for money damages. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978). Finally, an administrative action is likely to prove speedier and less costly than a lawsuit. These advantages are not clearly outweighed by the obvious and significant disadvantages of the civil service procedure — that it denies the claimant the option of a jury trial, see Carlson v. Green, supra, at 22-23 , and that it affords *392 only limited judicial review rather than a full trial in federal court, see Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840, 851-853 (1976).
As the Court emphasizes, “[t]he question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed.” Ante, at 388. The question is whether an alternative remedy should be provided when the wrong may already be redressed under “an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations.” Ibid. I agree that a Bivens remedy is unnecessary in this case.
See, e. g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 285, 300-301, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1207-1208 (1979), aff’d in pertinent part by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981).