holding that Federal Bank Robbery Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 , was “not limited to common-law larceny,” and rejecting possibility that “Congress wished to limit the scope of the amended Act’s coverage, and thus limit its remedial purpose, on the basis of an arcane and artificial distinction more suited to the social conditions of 18th century England than the needs of 20th century America”
How later courts described this case
- holding that Federal Bank Robbery Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 , was “not limited to common-law larceny,” and rejecting possibility that “Congress wished to limit the scope of the amended Act’s coverage, and thus limit its remedial purpose, on the basis of an arcane and artificial distinction more suited to the social conditions of 18th century England than the needs of 20th century America”
- holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (b), which prohibits taking and carrying away, with intent to steal or purloin money from a bank, includes theft by false pretenses, i.e., acquir- ing title to property through trickery
- holding that "tak[ing] and carr[ying] away, with intent to steal or purloin" is broader than common law larceny and includes taking by false pretenses
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Although federal criminal statutes that are intended to fill a void in local law enforcement should be construed broadly, see, e. g., United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F. 2d 53, 57-58 (CA7 1975) (en banc), I take a different approach to federal *363 laws that merely subject the citizen to the risk of prosecution by two different sovereigns. See, e. g., United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d 310, 316 (CA7 1971). When there is no perceivable obstacle to effective state enforcement, I believe federal criminal legislation should be narrowly construed unless it is clear that Congress intended the coverage in dispute. McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642, 675 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 104-105 (1943).
The history of the bank robbery and bank larceny legislation enacted in 1934 and 1937 persuades me that Congress did not intend federal law to encompass the conduct of obtaining funds from a bank with its consent, albeit under false pretenses. The 1934 Act was a response to the spate of armed bank robberies committed by John Dillinger and other traveling gunmen who outwitted and outmaneuvered a series of local police forces as they moved from State to State in the early 1930’s. 1 Congress responded to local requests for federal assistance by enacting a statute that prohibited robbery of federal banks, but rejected the section initially passed by the Senate that made larceny by false pretenses a federal *364 offense. 2 It is clear that Congress did not intend the federal law to overlap state jurisdiction to any greater extent than was necessary to cope with the specific evil that had given rise to the legislation. 3
*365 Three years later the bank robbery statute was amended at the request of Attorney General Cummings. The Attorney General specifically described the anomaly created by the statute’s failure to cover larceny by stealth, theft of money from a bank without violence but also clearly without the bank’s consent. 4 The amendment — making burglary and “larceny” of federal banks a federal crime — was adopted routinely, without significant comment or debate. 5 It is fair to infer that Congress viewed the amendment as a limited change that was entirely consistent with the intent of the 1934 Act, including the intent of legislators who perceived a danger in encouraging the unnecessary growth of a national police force.
This interpretation of the legislative history was accepted by all of the Members of this Court in Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101 (1943), a case decided only six years after the passage of the bank larceny statute. The defendant in that case had been convicted in federal court for entering a national bank with intent to utter a forged promissory note. Although the Court was construing a different section of the statute, its discussion of Congress’ intent is equally applicable to the section involved in this case. 6 Justice Douglas observed:
*366 “It is difficult to conclude in the face of this history that Congress, having rejected in 1934 an express provision making state felonies federal offenses, reversed itself in 1937 .... It is likewise difficult to believe that Congress, through the same clause, adopted by indirection in 1937 much of the fraud provision which it rejected in 1934.” Id., at 105-106 .
Further, the Court noted, “there is not the slightest indication that the interstate activities of gangsters against national and insured banks had broken down or rendered ineffective enforcement of state laws covering all sorts of felonies.” Id., at 107 . 7
Given the strong evidence of Congress’ specific, limited intent, I would confine the bank larceny statute to takings without the bank’s consent. Although I cannot deny that the Court’s construction of the statutory language is plausible, the language remains ambiguous. I would not at this late date repudiate Jerome's understanding of Congress’ intent. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The Department of Justice explained the need for new legislation largely by reference to the problem of armed robberies, though it recommended a bill broad enough to cover larceny by false pretenses as well. Its memorandum, quoted in the House Report, explains:
“This bill is directed at one of the most serious forms of crime committed by organized gangsters who operate habitually from one State to another— the robbery of banks. From all sections of this country Federal relief has been requested. It is asserted that these criminals are sufficiently powerful and well equipped to defy local police, and to flee beyond the borders of the State before adequate forces can be organized to resist and capture these bandits.” H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934); see S. Rep. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934).
Indeed, the 1934 floor debates in the House included a clear reference to one of Dillinger’s well-known escapades. Representative Blanton noted that a man might go into a bank with intent to rob, and “he might use one of these new kind of Indiana six shooters carved out of a piece of wood with a pocket knife.” 78 Cong. Rec. 8132 (1934).
For the Department of Justice’s memoranda to Congress, see H. R. Rep. No. 1461, supra n. 1, at 2; S. Rep. No. 537, supra n. 1, at 1. The Senate bill provided, in part:
“Whoever, not being entitled to the possession of property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, takes and carries away, or attempts to take and carry away, such property or money or any other thing of value from any place (1) without the consent of such bank, or (2) with the consent of such bank obtained by the offender by any trick, artifice, fraud, or false or fraudulent representation, with intent to convert such property or money or any other thing of value to his use or to the use of any individual, association, partnership, or corporation, other than such bank, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.” S. 2841, § 2, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong. Rec. 8132 (1934) (emphasis supplied).
The House Judiciary Committee recommended that § 2, making bank larceny a federal crime, be stricken out. The House accepted the Committee amendment, and the Senate accepted the changes. Id., at 8767, 8776. During floor discussion of the Committee Report, Representative Hatton Sumners, longtime Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, made clear his reluctance to extend federal criminal jurisdiction. He explained, in opposing a proposed amendment extending the reach of the bill to other governmental institutions: “I may say to the gentleman that we are going rather far in this bill, since all the property is owned, as a rule, by the citizens of the community where the bank is located. The committee was not willing to go further, and the Attorney General did not ask it to go further.” Id., at 8133. As a contemporary observer noted, Sumners “sought throughout the session to confine extensions of federal power to those situations where the need to supplement state and local law enforcing agencies had become imperative.” A Note on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and “Kick-Back” Laws, 1 Law & Contemp. Prob. 445, 448-449 (1934).
The Department of Justice expressly stated in its memorandum:
“There is no intention that the Federal Government shall supersede the State authorities in this class of cases. It will intervene only to cooperate with local forces when it is evident that the latter cannot cope with the criminals.” H. R. Rep. No. 1461, supra n. 1, at 2.
“The fact that the statute is limited to robbery and does not include larceny and burglary has led to some incongruous results. A striking instance arose a short time ago, when a man was arrested in a national bank while walking out of the building with $11,000 of the bank’s funds on his person. He had managed to gain possession of the money during a momentary absence of one of the employees, without displaying any force or violence and without putting any one in fear — necessary elements of the crime of robbery — and was about to leave the bank when apprehended. As a result, it was not practicable to prosecute him under any Federal statute.” H. R. Rep. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1937).
See, e. g., 81 Cong. Rec. 5376-5377 (1937).
The provision construed by the Court made it a federal offense to enter any bank with intent to commit “any felony or larceny.” The Court expressly noted that the term “larceny” was defined in the statute itself — a reference to the section at issue here. 318 U. S., at 105, 106 .
As the Ninth Circuit wrote in LeMasters v. United States, 378 F. 2d 262, 268 (1967), quoted in full in United States v. Feroni, 655 F. 2d 707, 710-711 (CA6 1981):
“In the bank situation we see no reason, urgent or otherwise, why Congress in 1937 should have wanted to enter the field of obtaining by false pretenses, duplicating state law which was adequate and effectively enforced, and the duplication of which would bring innumerable cases, most of them small, within the jurisdiction of federal prosecutors and courts. Congress was as aware in 1937 as it was in 1934, when it rejected the unambiguous provision making obtaining by false pretense from a bank [a] federal crime, that such an extension of federal law would serve no purpose except to confuse and dilute state responsibility for local crimes which were being adequately dealt with by state law.”