stating that, while an employee will ordinarily be bound by the results of a grievance procedure "according to the final- ity provisions of the [collective bargaining] agreement," an employee can challenge the results of that grievance procedure by bringing a hybrid claim against the union, the employer, or both, alleging that 7 the union represented him in the grievance proceedings in a "discrimi- natory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion" and that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement
How later courts described this case
- stating that, while an employee will ordinarily be bound by the results of a grievance procedure "according to the final- ity provisions of the [collective bargaining] agreement," an employee can challenge the results of that grievance procedure by bringing a hybrid claim against the union, the employer, or both, alleging that 7 the union represented him in the grievance proceedings in a "discrimi- natory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion" and that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement
- explaining that when “there is no federal statute of limitations expressly applicable to [a] suit…[the Court] do[es] not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at all; rather, [the Court’s] task is to ‘borrow’ the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source. We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.”
- holding that claims against union for breach of duty of fair representation and claims against employer for breach of contract are “inextricably interdependent,” and that “[t]o prevail against either the company or the Union, employee-plaintiffs must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union.”
- explaining that “[t]o prevail against either the company or the [u]nion” on a hybrid claim, an employee “must not only show” a breach of the collective bargaining agreement, “but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the [union]” (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned — as noted by a later court
Four years later, in West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987), the Court limited its holding in DelCostello.
medium confidenceDeclined to follow by Graham v. Quincy Food Service Employees Ass'n & Hospital, Library & Public Employees Union, 407 Mass. 601 (1990)
Because the DelCostello case was based on Federal policy concerns, we decline to follow it with respect to actions for breach of the duty of fair representation arising under G. L. c. 150E.9
Declined to follow by Michael Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal Company, a Corporation, 762 F.2d 381 (1985)
In any event, in this case, under circumstances in which a retroactive application of DelCostello presents manifest unfairness, we decline to follow Welyczko and Smith.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bullock v. Dressel, 435 F.3d 294 (2006)
Id. Because the plaintiffs were only asserting that their union wrongfully refused to refer them from its hiring hall, the dispute had "no more than an indirect influence on the union's ability to negotiate effectively with those employers who hire [union members] through the hiring hall," and, thus, DelCostello was inapposite.
Distinguished by Gilmore v. Local 295, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 798 F. Supp. 1030 (1992)
462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), is inapposite considering the Court’s more recent holding in
Distinguished by General Teamsters Union Local No. 174 v. Trick & Murray, Inc., 828 F.2d 1418 (1987)
Instead, we distinguished DelCostello.
Distinguished by Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (1987)
Accordingly, DelCostello is inapplicable and Pennsylvania law governs.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
dissenting.
As the Court recognizes, “resort to state law [is] the norm for borrowing of limitations periods.” Ante, at 171. When federal law is silent on the question of limitations, we borrow state law in the belief that, given our longstanding practice and congressional awareness of it, we can safely assume, in the absence of strong indications to the contrary, that Congress intends by its silence that we follow the usual rule. 1 *175 In Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696 (1966), we applied the “norm” to a suit under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185 .. I see no reason in these cases to depart from our usual practice of borrowing state law, for we have no contrary indications strong enough to outweigh our ordinary presumption that Congress’ silence indicates a desire that we follow the ordinary rule. As a result, I would look to state law for a limitations period. For the reasons given by Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 72-74 (1981), I think that a malpractice action against an attorney provides the closest analogy to an employee’s suit against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation, and I would apply the State’s statute of limitations for such an action here. In DelCostello’s action against his employer, I, like Justice Stevens, would follow Mitchell . 2
I believe, basically for the reasons given by the Court, ante, at 159-161, n. 13, that our practice of borrowing state periods of limitations depends largely on this general guide for divining congressional intent. See, e. g., Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 704 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946). I agree with the Court that the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652 , only puts the question, for it simply requires application of state law unless federal law applies. See ante, at 159-161, n. 13. Therefore, I am unable to join Justice Stevens’ dissent. *175 My disagreement with the Court arises because I do not think that federal law implicitly rejects the practice of borrowing state periods of limitations in this situation.
It is quite appropriate to apply Mitchell retroactively. Mitchell did not represent a “clear break” with past law, see Mitchell, 451 U. S., at 61-62 , application of its rule in this case would further the goal of promoting early finality for arbitral awards, id., at 63 , and there is no inequity in applying the rule here. See Lawson v. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, 698 P. 2d 250 , 254 (CA6 1983); see generally Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971).