holding that an agency may rely on rulemaking to "resolve certain classes of issues" despite the fact that the statute calls for individualized decisionmaking, noting that to hold otherwise "would require the agency continually to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding"
How later courts described this case
- holding that an agency may rely on rulemaking to "resolve certain classes of issues" despite the fact that the statute calls for individualized decisionmaking, noting that to hold otherwise "would require the agency continually to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding"
- holding that where a social security statute expressly delegates to the Secretary the responsibility for implementing a provision, the court’s review is limited to determining whether the resulting regulation exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority and whether the regulation is arbitrary and capricious
- stating that, at this step, the ALJ is required to perform a two-part analysis to (1) assess the claimant’s job qualifications by considering his physical ability, age, education, and work experience, and then (2) determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant could perform
- concluding that the use of occupational Grids is not violative of the Social Security Act and stating that “[t]his type of general factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by introducing the testimony of vocational experts at each disability hearing”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. It merits comment, however, that the hearing respondent received, see ante, at 462-463, if it is in any way indicative of standard practice, reflects *471 poorly on the Administrative Law Judge’s adherence to what Chief Judge Godbold has called his “duty of inquiry”:
“[T]here is a ‘basic obligation’ on the ALJ in these nonadversarial proceedings to develop a full and fair record, which obligation rises to a ‘ “special duty ... to scrupulously and conscientiously explore for all the relevant facts’” where an unrepresented claimant has not waived counsel. This duty of inquiry on the ALJ would include, in a case decided under the grids, a duty to inquire into possible nonexertional impairments and into exertional limitations that prevent a full range of work.” Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F. 2d 1351, 1364 (CA11 1982). 1
In her brief to this Court, the Secretary acknowledges that the Social Security regulations embody this duty and relies upon it in answering respondent’s due process contentions. Brief for Petitioner 42 (citing Broz v. Schweiker, supra)] see 20 CFR § 404.944 (1982); ante, at 468, and n. 12. The Administrative Law Judge’s “duty to inquire” takes on special urgency where, as here, the claimant has little education and limited fluency in English, and, given that the claimant already has a right to a hearing, the additional cost of pursuing relevant issues at the hearing is minimal.
*472 In order to find that respondent was not disabled, the Secretary had to determine that she had the physical capacity to do “light work,” compare 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, §201.10 (1982), with id., §202.10, a determination that required a finding that she was capable of frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds and sometimes lifting up to 20 pounds, 20 CFR §404.1567 (b) (1982). The hearing record included one disinterested doctor’s report of a medical examination of respondent that concluded with the unexplained statement “Patient may return to light-duty work,” App. 11, and a subsequent report by a second disinterested doctor stating that respondent could lift and carry only “up to 10 pounds,” id., at 32 . In finding that respondent could perform “light work,” the Administrative Law Judge rejected the second doctor’s report as “without basis.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a-25a. Yet he failed entirely to adduce evidence relevant to this issue at respondent’s hearing. At several points during the hearing, respondent stated that she could not lift things, but the Administrative Law Judge did not question her on the subject at all, 2 nor did he make any inquiry whether by “light-duty work” the first doctor meant the same thing as the Secretary’s term “light work.”
The Administrative Law Judge further failed to inquire whether factors besides strength, age, or education, combined with her other impairments, rendered respondent disabled. See 20 CFR pt. 404, supra, § 200.00(e)(2); ante, at 462, n. 5. Apparently such factors could have been dispositive of *473 the case before us: The Secretary has since determined that respondent is in fact disabled, see ante, at 463, n. 7, based on consideration of severe emotional complications not explored at all by the Administrative Law Judge in the hearing that led to her petition for review in this case. 3
This issue was not presented to the Court of Appeals, nor passed upon by it. See ante, at 468-469, n. 12. In terms of ensuring fair and accurate determinations of disability claims, the obligation that the Court of Appeals would have placed on administrative law judges was a poor substitute for good-faith performance of the “duty of inquiry” they already have. The federal courts have been successful in enforcing this duty in the past, see n. 1, supra, and I respectfully suggest that the Secretary insist upon its faithful performance in future cases.
Accord, Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F. 2d 936, 941 (CA9 1982); Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F. 2d 408, 414 (CA5 1981); Diabo v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 225, 229, 627 F. 2d 278, 282 (1980); Cox v. Califano, 587 F. 2d 988, 991 (CA9 1978); Smith v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 587 F. 2d 857, 860 (CA7 1978); Gold v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 463 F. 2d 38, 43 (CA2 1972). The “duty of inquiry” derives from claimants’ basic statutory and constitutional right to due process in the adjudication of their claims, including a de novo hearing, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332-335, 339 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 402-404 (1971). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262-263 (1970). Inherent in the concept of a due process hearing is the decisionmaker’s obligation to inform himself about facts relevant to his decision and to learn the claimant’s own version of those facts. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 580 (1975).
The following colloquy appears on the record:
“Q. Can you bend?
“A. I cannot bend. The doctor warned me not to lift weights.
“Q. Uh-huh.
“A. And—
“Q. I notice you have stood up several times since you’ve been in here.” App. 49-50.
At no point did the Administrative Law Judge so much as ask respondent how she did her shopping, or any other question that might have elicited information on the crucial question of how much she could regularly lift.
See App. to Brief for Respondent 2a-3a. The decision appears to have rested on evidence similar to the evidence in the record at the hearing in this case, except that the Administrative Law Judge took note that respondent was “an obese, sad individual, who had marked difficulties in sitting, standing, and walking,” and he found that her severe back disorder was “complicated by an emotional overlay.” Id., at 3a.