holding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated by denial of his motion to continue trial until the deputy public defender initially assigned to defend him was available, where a senior trial attorney in the public defender's office was assigned to represent the defendant and the court was assured that the assigned attorney was fully prepared and ready for trial
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated by denial of his motion to continue trial until the deputy public defender initially assigned to defend him was available, where a senior trial attorney in the public defender's office was assigned to represent the defendant and the court was assured that the assigned attorney was fully prepared and ready for trial
- holding, in context of constitutional right to assistance of counsel, that “broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances” and that “only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ ” violates rights guaranteed by constitution
- stating that “broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel” (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 598 (1964))
- finding there is no Sixth Amendment right to “a meaningful attorney-client relationship” and that denial of a continuance to give an attorney who was appointed to appellant’s case six days before trial more time to prepare was not an abuse of discretion
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Mebane, 204 Conn. 585 (1987)
” Id., 11. Slappy is inapposite here for several reasons.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in the judgment.
The narrow question before the Court is whether the state trial judge should have inquired about the probable length of attorney Goldfine’s incapacitation in order to balance respondent’s right to counsel against society’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals erred in construing respondent’s complaints on the first day of trial as indicating a desire to be represented by Goldfine. Absent a timely request by respondent to postpone the trial until Goldfine recovered from his illness, the state trial judge had no reason to inquire into the likely length of Goldfine’s unavailability. For this reason, I concur in the Court’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I also agree with the Court that, “[h]ad the Court of Appeals examined the record more carefully, it would have had no occasion to consider, let alone announce, a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment.” Ante, at 14. It seems to me, however, that this Court, after examining the record carefully and finding it “dispositive,” ante, at 4, similarly has “no occasion to consider” the Sixth Amendment issue. Accordingly, I find the Court’s rather broad-ranging dicta about the right to counsel and the concerns of victims (deserving of sympathy as they may be) to be unnecessary in this case.