Opinion

Texas v. Brown

  • 460 U.S. 730
  • 51 U.S.L.W. 4361
  • 103 S. Ct. 1535
  • 75 L. Ed. 2d 502
  • 1983 U.S. LEXIS 143
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Apr 19, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Powell
On the bench
Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Marshall, O'ConnoR, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, White
Cited by
2,739 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.2%

Reported abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list

finding that an officer had probable cause that an “opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one-half inch from the tip” contained drugs because “the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents—particularly to the trained eye of the officer,” and the officer “was able to observe the contents of the glove compartment of [the defendant’s] car, which revealed further suggestions that [he] was engaged in ... possession of illicit substances.”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that an officer had probable cause that an “opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one-half inch from the tip” contained drugs because “the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents—particularly to the trained eye of the officer,” and the officer “was able to observe the contents of the glove compartment of [the defendant’s] car, which revealed further suggestions that [he] was engaged in ... possession of illicit substances.”
  • stating that “[w]hen a police officer has [lawfully] observed an object in ‘plain view,’ the owner’s remaining interests in the object are merely those of possession and ownership . . . . Likewise, . . . requiring police to obtain a warrant once they have [lawfully] obtained a first-hand perception of contraband, stolen property, or incriminating evidence generally would be a ‘needless inconvenience,’ . . . that might involve danger to the police and public”
  • holding that an officer’s bending down and using a flashlight in order to obtain a better view into a car did not violate the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights because "[t]here is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers” (citations omitted)
  • holding that probable cause merely requires that facts available to officer would warrant man of reasonable caution to believe that items are contraband; probable cause did not require showing that such belief was correct or more likely true than false; and police officer did not have to have “near certainty” or “know” that items were contraband in order to have probable cause

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Reported abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    460 US 730, 740, 103 S Ct 1535, 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 US 128, 110 S Ct 2301, 110 L Ed 2d 112 (1990) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in interior of automobile that may be viewed from outside, even when officer used flashlight to illuminate interior and specially positioned himself to see inside)
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 4, 19903 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
  • Questioned by United States v. Johnnie Mack Morgan (82-5441) and George Brooks, Jr. (82-5442), Defendants, 744 F.2d 1215 (1985)

    While Texas v. Brown, supra, casts some doubts on the continuing validity of that requirement,6 it has not been expressly rejected.
    Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitJan 3, 1985Read it

The opinion

Justice Powell,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the plurality’s opinion relating to the application in this case of the plain-view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not join the plurality’s opinion because it goes well beyond the application of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquently:

“One cannot wrench ‘unreasonable searches’ from the text and context and historic content of the Fourth *745 Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 'unreasonable searches’ and then went on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.” Id., at 70 .

To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited Justice Frankfurter’s Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the importance of the Warrant Clause. 407 U. S., at 316 . Although I would not say that exceptions can be justified only by “absolute necessity,” 1 I stated that they were “few in number and carefully delineated.” Id., at 318 . This has continued to be my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 825 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) (unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958).

This case involves an application of the plain-view exception, first addressed at some length by the plurality portion of the opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The plurality today states that this opinion “has *746 never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court.” Ante, at 737. Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation is dispositive of the question before us.

Respondent Brown does not dispute that Officer Maples’ initial intrusion was lawful. Brown also concedes that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta suggest, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in uninflated, tied-off balloons such as the one Officer Maples seized.

*747 Accordingly, I concur in the judgment as it is consistent with principles established by our prior decisions.

1 have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).

See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9 1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA1 1982); United States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CA10), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 949 (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d 1309, 1313-1314 (CA51978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 66-67 (CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt, 521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d 67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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