explaining traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion must be limited in scope and duration because “Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has always been interpreted to prevent a search that is not limited to the particularly described ‘place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,’ even if the search is made pursuant to a warrant and based upon probable cause,” and this protection is not “diluted” in context of investigatory stop (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion must be limited in scope and duration because “Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has always been interpreted to prevent a search that is not limited to the particularly described ‘place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,’ even if the search is made pursuant to a warrant and based upon probable cause,” and this protection is not “diluted” in context of investigatory stop (citation omitted)
- holding that "there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory detention, such as from an airport concourse to a more private area," but holding in that case that "[t]he record does not reflect any facts which would support a finding that the legitimate law enforcement purposes which justified the detention in the first instance were furthered by removing Royer to the police room ..."
- stating that although detectives' requesting and examining prospective airline passenger's ticket and driver's license were permissible, passenger was effectively "seized" for Fourth-Amendment purposes when detectives identified themselves as narcotics agents, told passenger he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked passenger to accompany them to adjacent airport storage room while retaining his ticket, driver's license, and luggage throughout the encounter
- stating that when a person is approached by the police as part of drug interdiction efforts at an airport, the person “need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way .... [h]e may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. McMillin, Unpublished Decision (4-29-2005), 2005 Ohio 2096 (2005)
{¶ 47} Contrary to appellant's arguments, we find that the facts inRoyer are distinguishable from the present case.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Hoak, 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2637 (1997)
Royer is distinguishable from the instant case on two critical points: appellant’s license and registration were returned to him, and he was advised he was free to leave before police asked if he would answer questions.
Distinguished by United States v. Monica Campos, United States of America v. Maria Carranza, 980 F.2d 739 (1992)
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) is inapplicable to the present facts because Campos and Carranza each consented to an interview with the DEA agent prior to the point at which they claim that they were illegally seized
Distinguished by United States v. Reginald Glover, 957 F.2d 1004 (1992)
Royer is plainly distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Powell,
concurring.
I join the plurality opinion. This is an airport “stop for questioning” case similar in its general setting to that before us in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). 1 The plurality opinion today has discussed helpfully the principles applicable to investigative stops for questioning. Since I was the author of one of the opinions in Mendenhall, id., at 560, I write briefly to repeat that the public has a compelling interest in identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in illicit drugs for personal profit. As the plurality opinion emphasizes, ante, at 506-507, the facts and circumstances of investigative stops necessarily vary. In view of the extent to which air transportation is used in the drug traffic, the fact that the stop at issue is made by trained officers in an airport warrants special consideration. 2
This case, however, differs strikingly from Mendenhall in the circumstances following the lawful initial questioning and the request that the suspect accompany the officers to a more private place. Royer then found himself in a small, windowless room — described as a “large closet” — alone with two officers who, without his consent, already had obtained possession of his checked luggage. In addition, they had retained his driver’s license and airline ticket. Neither the evidence *509 in this case nor common sense suggests that Royer was free to walk away. I agree with the plurality that as a practical matter he then was under arrest, and his surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as consensual.
As the plurality notes, ante, at 504, n. 9, five Justices in Mendenhall were of the view that the respondent in that case had not been illegally detained, and therefore that she had consented to be searched.
Since 1974 the Drug Enforcement Administration has assigned highly skilled agents to the major airports as part of a nationwide program to intercept drug couriers. These agents are guided in part by a “drug courier profile” that identifies characteristics that experience has shown to be relevant in identifying suspects. See Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 562 .