holding that the EHA established right to public education for students with disabilities that "consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child `to benefit' from the instruction"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the EHA established right to public education for students with disabilities that "consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child `to benefit' from the instruction"
- explaining, in a case about the predecessor statute to the IDEA, that “if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, . . . the child is receiving a ‘free appropriate public education’ as defined by the Act”
- recognizing that when “a child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the system itself monitors the educational progress of the child.... The grading and advancement system thus constitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit.”
- finding that “free appropriate public education” requirement of IDEA “consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the instruction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Nb v. Hellgate Elementary School Dist. Ex Rel. Board of Directors — not on the Supreme Court's list
73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), superseded by statute on other grounds, N.B. v. Hellgate 14 Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitSep 4, 20083 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Board of Education of LaGrange School District No. 105 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 184 F.3d 912 (1999)
However, the Rowley standard is inapplicable because that case did not reach the issue of placement in the least restrictive environment.
Distinguished by Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (1988)
Additionally, Rowley is distinguishable from the case sub judice because of the type of services requested.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
Although I reach the same result as the Court does today, I read the legislative history and goals of the Education of the Handicapped Act differently. Congress unambiguously stated that it intended to “take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity.” S. Rep. No. 94r-168, p. 9 (1975) (emphasis added). See also 20 U. S. C. § 1412 (2)(A)(i) (requiring States to establish plans with the “goal of providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children”).
As I have observed before, “[i]t seems plain to me that Congress, in enacting [this statute], intended to do more than merely set out politically self-serving but essentially meaningless language about what the [handicapped] deserve at the hands of state . . . authorities.” Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 32 (1981) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The clarity of the legislative *211 intent convinces me that the relevant question here is not, as the Court says, whether Amy Rowley’s individualized education program was “reasonably calculated to enable [her] to receive educational benefits,” ante, at 207, measured in part by whether or not she “achieve[s] passing marks and advance^] from grade to grade,” ante, at 204. Rather, the question is whether Amy’s program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given her non-handicapped classmates. This is a standard predicated on equal educational opportunity and equal access to the educational process, rather than upon Amy’s achievement of any particular educational outcome.
In answering this question, I believe that the District Court and the Court of Appeals should have given greater deference than they did to the findings of the School District’s impartial hearing officer and the State’s Commissioner of Education, both of whom sustained petitioners’ refusal to add a sign-language interpreter to Amy’s individualized education program. Cf. 20 U. S. C. § 1415 (e)(2) (requiring reviewing court to “receive the records of the administrative proceedings” before granting relief). I would suggest further that those courts focused too narrowly on the presence or absence of a particular service — a sign-language interpreter — rather than on the total package of services furnished to Amy by the School Board.
As the Court demonstrates, ante, at 184-185, petitioner Board has provided Amy Rowley considerably more than “a teacher with a loud voice.” See post, at 215 (dissenting opinion). By concentrating on whether Amy was “learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she would without her handicap,” 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (SDNY 1980), the District Court and the Court of Appeals paid too little attention to whether, on the entire record, respondent’s individualized education program offered her an educational op *212 portunity substantially equal to that provided her nonhandicapped classmates. Because I believe that standard has been satisfied here, I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.