reasoning that, without qualified immunity, "there is the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties'" (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 , 70 S. Ct. 803 , 94 L. Ed. 1363 (1950)) (alterations in original)
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that, without qualified immunity, "there is the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties'" (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 , 70 S. Ct. 803 , 94 L. Ed. 1363 (1950)) (alterations in original)
- recognizing that qualified immunity fails if an officer “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury” (citation modified)
- explaining that on motion raising a qualified immunity defense, “the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time at the time an action occurred [. . . and u]ntil this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed”
- explaining that it must be proven that defendants knew or reasonably should have known that the actions they took within their sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of plaintiff, or that they took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Elder v. Holloway, 984 F.2d 991 (1993)
Two aspects of the Harlow test call into question the panel’s reading of Davis.
Criticized by Guider v. Smith, 431 Mich. 559 (1988)
We recognize that Harlow and Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635; 107 S Ct 3034; 97 L Ed 2d 523 (1987), have been criticized as unduly expanding the scope of the qualified immunity defense.
Disagreed with in part by James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs v. Edward Malley, 748 F.2d 715 (1984)
While we disagree with the district court’s view that the Harlow standard fails to address policy considerations, we do recognize that this standard was initially developed for application to high executive officials, not police officers.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Whitacre v. Davey, 727 F. Supp. 636 (1988)
Plaintiff argues that Harlow is distinguishable because, in plaintiff’s view, the quasi-judicial function here is not “discretionary” and Harlow spoke to summary judgment proceedings rather than motion to dismiss.
Distinguished by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)
Under this view, the Harlow standard is inapposite because this Court’s doctrine grants qualified immunity to officials in the performance of discretionary, but not ministerial, functions.
Distinguished by Paradis v. School Administrative District No. 33 School Board, 1983 Me. LEXIS 732 (1983)
Harlow, however, is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, concurring.
I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defend *821 ant “knew or should have known” of the constitutionally vio-lative effect of his actions. Ante, at 815, 819. This standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not “reasonably have been expected” to know what he actually did know. Ante, at 819, n. 33. Thus the clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes. I also agree that this standard applies “across the board,” to all “government officials performing discretionary functions.” Ante, at 818. I write separately only to note that given this standard, it seems inescapable to me that some measure of discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a public-official defendant did “know” at the time of his actions. In this respect the issue before us is very similar to that addressed in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153 (1979), in which the Court observed that “[t]o erect an impenetrable barrier to the plaintiff’s use of such evidence on his side of the case is a matter of some substance, particularly when defendants themselves are prone to assert their goo[d fjaith . . . .” Id., at 170 . Of course, as the Court has already noted, ante, at 818-819, summary judgment will be readily available to public-official defendants whenever the state of the law was so ambiguous at the time of the alleged violation that it could not have been “known” then, and thus liability could not ensue. In my view, summary judgment will also be readily available whenever the plaintiff cannot prove, as a threshold matter, .that a violation of his constitutional rights actually occurred. I see no reason why discovery of defendants’ “knowledge” should not be deferred by the trial judge pending decision of any motion of defendants for summary judgment on grounds such as these. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, supra, at 180, n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan,
Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, concurring.
We join the Court’s opinion but, having dissented in Nixon *822 v. Fitzgerald, ante, p. 731, we disassociate ourselves from any implication in the Court’s opinion in the present case that Nixon v. Fitzgerald was correctly decided.
Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
At such time as a majority of the Court is willing to reexamine our holding in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), I shall join in that undertaking with alacrity. But until that time comes, I agree that the Court’s opinion in this case properly disposes of the issues presented, and I therefore join it.