holding that a district court may not certify a class without ruling that each Rule 23 requirement is met, even if a requirement overlaps with a merits issue
How later courts described this case
- holding that a district court may not certify a class without ruling that each Rule 23 requirement is met, even if a requirement overlaps with a merits issue
- holding that named plaintiff must prove “much more than the validity of his own claim”; the individual plaintiff must show that “the individual’s claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims,” explicitly referencing the “commonality” and “typicality” requirements of Rule 23(a)
- finding that an individual employee's claim of discriminatory treatment did not necessarily qualify the employee as an adequate class representative of individuals who allegedly had similar claims and stating that "it is noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract policy of discrimination" (emphasis in original)
- stating that commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation merge, “serv[ing] as guideposts for determining whether ... maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006)).
Supreme Court of the United StatesFeb 21, 20062 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itQuestioned by Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037 (1985)
457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981), calls into question the propriety of the class in this action.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Adair v. England, 209 F.R.D. 5 (2002)
” Id. at 159, 102 S.Ct. 2364. Falcon is easily distinguishable from the case at bar.
Distinguished by Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279 (1985)
However, Falcon is distinguishable because there the Title VII plaintiff sought “across the board” certification not only of those who had not been promoted but also of those who had not been hired.
Distinguished by Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786 (1984)
Therefore, Falcon is inapposite.
The opinion
Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s decision insofar as it states the general principles which apply in determining whether a class should be certified in this case under Rule 23. However, in my view it is not necessary to remand for further proceedings since it is entirely clear on this record that no class should have been certified in this case. I would simply reverse the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the class claim.
As the Court notes, the purpose of Rule 23 is to promote judicial economy by allowing for litigation of common questions of law and fact at one time. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 701 (1979). We have stressed that strict attention to the requirements of Rule 23 is indispensable in employment discrimination cases. East Texas Motor Freight Sys *162 tem, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 405-406 (1977). This means that class claims are limited to those ‘“fairly encompassed by the named plaintiffs claims.’ ” Ante, at 156, quoting General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, 330 (1980).
Respondent claims that he was not promoted to a job as field inspector because he is a Mexiean-American. To be successful in his claim, which he advances under the “disparate treatment” theory, he must convince a court that those who were promoted were promoted not because they were better qualified than he was, but, instead, that he was not promoted for discriminatory reasons. The success of this claim depends on evaluation of the comparative qualifications of the applicants for promotion to field inspector and on analysis of the credibility of the reasons for the promotion decisions provided by those who made the decisions. Respondent’s class claim on behalf of unsuccessful applicants for jobs with petitioner, in contrast, is advanced under the “adverse impact” theory. Its success depends on an analysis of statistics concerning petitioner’s hiring patterns. *
The record in this case clearly shows that there are no common questions of law or fact between respondent’s claim and the class claim; the only commonality is that respondent is a Mexican-American and he seeks to represent a class of Mexican-Americans. See ante, at 153, and n. 9. We have repeatedly held that the bare fact that a plaintiff alleges racial or ethnic discrimination is not enough to justify class certification. Ante, at 157; East Texas Motor Freight, supra, at 405-406. Accordingly, the class should not have been certified.
*163 Moreover, while a judge’s decision to certify a class is not normally to be evaluated by hindsight, ante, at 160, since the judge cannot know what the evidence will show, there is no reason for us at this stage of these lengthy judicial proceedings not to proceed in light of the evidence actually presented. The Court properly concludes that the Court of Appeals and the District Court failed to consider the requirements of Rule 23. In determining whether to reverse and remand or to simply reverse, we can and should look at the evidence. The record shows that there is no support for the class claim. Respondent’s own statistics show that 7.7% of those hired by petitioner between 1972 and 1976 were Mexican-American while the relevant labor force was 5.2% Mexican-American. Falcon v. General Telephone Company of Southwest, 626 F. 2d 369 , 372, 381, n. 16 (1980). Petitioner’s unchallenged evidence shows that it hired Mexican-Americans in numbers greater than their percentage of the labor force even though Mexican-Americans applied for jobs with petitioner in numbers smaller than their percentage of the labor force. Id., at 373, n. 4. This negates any claim of Falcon as a class representative.
Like so many Title VII cases, this case has already gone on for years, draining judicial resources as well as resources of the litigants. Rather than promoting judicial economy, the “across-the-board” class action has promoted multiplication of claims and endless litigation. Since it is clear that the class claim brought on behalf of unsuccessful applicants for jobs with petitioner cannot succeed, I would simply reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the class claim.
There is no allegation that those who made the hiring decisions are the same persons who determined who was promoted to field inspector. Thus there is no claim that the same person or persons who made the challenged decisions were motivated by prejudice against Mexican-Americans, and that this prejudice manifested itself in both the hiring decisions and the decisions not to promote respondent.