holding that information originally gathered for law enforcement purposes by the FBI did not lose its status under Exemption 7 because it was placed in a different compilation for a political purpose by the White House
How later courts described this case
- holding that information originally gathered for law enforcement purposes by the FBI did not lose its status under Exemption 7 because it was placed in a different compilation for a political purpose by the White House
- indicating that a two part inquiry is necessary to determine whether Exemption (b)(7) has been properly invoked — (1) whether the document was compiled for law enforcement purposes and (2) whether one of the six harms listed in Exemption (b)(7) has been demonstrated
- indicating that Exemption 7 requires two prong inquiry into (1) whether requested documents is as compiled for law enforcement purposes, and (2) whether "release of the material would have one of the six results specified in the Act"
- explaining that Exemption (7)(A) operates “to prevent premature disclosure of investigatory materials which might be used in a law enforcement action”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(7), permits agencies to withhold “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would . . . (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (Emphasis added.) The Court today holds that this language authorizes petitioner FBI to withhold investigatory records not compiled for law enforcement purposes simply because some information contained in those records was compiled for such purposes. The Court declares that “[o]nce it is established that information was compiled pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement investigation and that disclosure of such information would lead to one of the listed harms [in Exemption 7], the information is exempt.” Ante, at 631 (emphasis added).
I cannot escape the conclusion that the Court has simply substituted the word “information” for the word “records” in Exemption 7(C). Yet we have earlier recognized that “[t]he Freedom of Information Act deals with 'agency records,’ not information in the abstract.” Forsham v. Harris, 445 U. S. 169, 185 (1980). I agree with Justice O’Connor’s assess *633 ment that the legislative history reveals that Congress chose the term “records,” rather than the word “information,” advisedly. The Court’s unwillingness to give the statutory language its plain meaning requires judges who are evaluating Exemption 7(C) claims to parse agency records and determine whether any piece of information contained in those records was originally compiled for a law enforcement purpose. Because the Court presents no reason, convincing to me, why its deviation from the statutory language is necessary or desirable, I respectfully dissent.