holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not require the district court to enjoin the navy from discharging ordnance into water surrounding Puerto Rico because the statute did not unequivocally indicate congressional intent to limit the courts’ traditional equitable discretion
How later courts described this case
- holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not require the district court to enjoin the navy from discharging ordnance into water surrounding Puerto Rico because the statute did not unequivocally indicate congressional intent to limit the courts’ traditional equitable discretion
- holding that, in the ______________ face of a violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, a district court is not required to enjoin any and all activity related to the Act's violation, but instead is charged with developing remedies to ensure the violator's compliance with the Act
- stating that " ‘the comprehensiveness of [the courts'] equitable [authority] is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command’" (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414 (1985)
Romero-Barcelo is distinguishable from the matter before us in several important respects.
The opinion
*321 Justice Powell,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. In my view, however, the record clearly establishes that the District Court in this case did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enjoin the immediate cessation of all discharges. Finding that the District Court acted well within the equitable discretion left to it under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions that the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. *
The propriety of this disposition is emphasized by the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, post, p. 322. I agree with his view that Congress may limit a court’s equitable discretion in granting remedies under a particular statute, and that some statutes may constrain discretion more narrowly than others. I stand with the Court, however, in finding no indication that Congress intended to limit the court’s equitable discretion under the FWPCA in the manner suggested by Justice Stevens. As the Court’s remand order might be thought to leave open whether the District Court in this case acted within its range of permissible discretion under the *322 FWPCA, it would promote both clarity and economy for us to hold now that the District Court did not abuse its discretion and that its decision should be reinstated.
The District Court’s thorough opinion demonstrates the reasonableness of its decision in light of all pertinent factors, including of course the evident purpose of the statute. The District Court concluded as matters of fact that the Navy’s violations have caused no “appreciable harm,” Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 706 (PR 1979), and indeed that the Navy’s control of the area “probably constitutes a positive factor in its over all ecology,” id., at 682 . Moreover, the District Court found it “abundantly clear from the evidence in the record . . . that the training that takes place in Vieques is vital to the defense of the interests of the United States.” Id., at 707 . Balancing the equities as they then stood, the District Court declined to order an immediate cessation of all violations but nonetheless issued affirmative orders aimed at securing compliance with the law. See id., at 708 . As I read its opinion, the District Court did not foreclose the possibility of ordering further relief that might become appropriate under changed circumstances at a later date.