holding that procedural default rules developed in the habeas corpus context apply in §2255 eases
How later courts described this case
- holding that procedural default rules developed in the habeas corpus context apply in §2255 eases
- concluding that Rule 52(b)’s plain error standard “was intended for use on direct appeal” and “is out of place when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction after society's legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment has been perfected by the expiration of the time allowed for direct review or by the affirmance of the conviction on appeal”
- holding in a murder case that "the strong uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record, coupled with [the defendant’s] utter failure to come forward with a colorable claim that he acted without malice, disposes of his contention that he suffered ... actual prejudice” from an instructional error that relieved the government of the burden of proving that element
- holding that this is a “significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” and requires “not merely that the errors at [Petitioner’s] trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage” such that they “overcome society’s justified interests in the finality of criminal judgments”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Charles N. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (1982)
At least Frady casts sufficient doubt on the continued vitality of Kaufman to allow us to consider as an original question whether failure to appeal on a ground later raised in a section 2255 motion should bar the motion unless good cause for not appealing is shown.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Dennis v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 779 (1996)
quired of a petitioner who pleaded guilty, announced in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), is inapplicable to this ease because the “actual innocence” exception enunciated in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2689, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (see United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir.1994)) is applicable to a § 924(c) violation under Bailey.
Distinguished by United States v. Alzate, 833 F. Supp. 90 (1993)
However, Frady is inapposite to this ease.
Distinguished by Dennis Wayne Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301 (1986)
We think the Frady rationale is inapplicable to this case for two reasons.
Distinguished by United States v. Herbert Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030 (1982)
We think the Frady rationale is inapplicable to this case for two reasons.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Although my view of the relevance of the cause for counsel’s failure to object to a jury instruction is significantly different from the Court’s, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 538 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Engle v. Isaac, ante, at 136-137, n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I have joined the Court’s opinion in this case because it properly focuses on the character of the prejudice to determine whether collateral relief is appropriate.