holding is consistent with Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161[d], 3161[h][6] [2006 & *714 Supp. Ill 2009], which provides “that if charges are initially dismissed and later reinstated, the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement is not to be included in computing the time within which trial must commence” [emphasis added]
How later courts described this case
- holding is consistent with Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161[d], 3161[h][6] [2006 & *714 Supp. Ill 2009], which provides “that if charges are initially dismissed and later reinstated, the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement is not to be included in computing the time within which trial must commence” [emphasis added]
- holding that constitutional speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable following the dismissal of an indictment because “[a]fter the charges against him have been dismissed, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is [no longer] the subject of public accusation”
- stating that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is * * * not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations"
- holding that speedy trial period did not commence because “there was no criminal prosecution pending on which [the defendant] could have been tried until the grand jury . . . returned the indictment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311 (1993)
The MacDonald court limited its holding to cases where the government had dismissed the original charges in good faith.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Butler, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 751 (2011)
In this case, the defendant, pressing the application of the speedy trial clause rather than the due process clause, argues that both MacDonald and Burton are distinguishable because, in each of those cases, the period in which the charges were first pending was short and not sufficient to trigger speedy trial concerns.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated by Justice Marshall in Part II of his opinion, I also conclude that MacDonald’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not suspended during the period between the Army’s dismissal of its charges in 1970 and the return of the civilian indictment in 1975. Justice Marshall also is clearly correct in stating that the question whether the delay was constitutionally unacceptable is “close.” Post, at 21. Since his opinion fairly identifies the countervailing factors, I need only state that the interest in allowing the Government to proceed cautiously and deliberately before making a final decision to prosecute for such a serious offense is of decisive importance for me in this case. I therefore concur in the Court’s judgment.