finding that “ ‘it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,’ ” and that “[a] rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “ ‘it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,’ ” and that “[a] rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error”
- holding that federal district court must dismiss a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition containing both Because Mr. Simpson filed his habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the 1 provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to his appeal. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). -3- unexhausted and exhausted claims
- holding that when a petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted issues the petition must be dismissed, "leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court"
- holding that a 21 district court must petitions containing unexhausted claims, “leaving the prisoner with the 22 choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the 23 habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) — not on the Supreme Court's list
455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1
Questioned by McClain v. Duckworth, 569 F. Supp. 840 (1983)
The continued viability of that holding is questionable in light of Rose v. Lundy, supra. See also the language contained in Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.1983).
Questioned by Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146 (2004)
By introducing a time limit, AEDPA calls into doubt the conclusion in Lundy that dismissal of a mixed petition does not "unreasonably impair the prisoner's right to relief," Lundy, 455 U.S. at 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, because in situations such as the present one, AEDPA's limitations period may act to deprive a petitioner of a federal forum if dismissal of the habeas petition is required.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ricky Lee Hendricks v. Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, Sued As: Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma Ron Ward, 162 F.3d 1173 (1998)
Although the magistrate judge recognized that ordinarily a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims should be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), he held this rule is inapplicable here because the claims should have been brought in separate petitions
Distinguished by Stamper v. Baskerville, 558 F. Supp. 100 (1983)
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with most of Justice Brennan’s opinion; but like Justice Blackmun, I. would not require a “mixed” petition to be dismissed in its entirety, with leave'to resubmit the exhausted claims. The trial judge cannot rule on the unex-hausted issues and should dismiss them. . But. he should rule on the exhausted claims unless they are intertwined with those he must dismiss or unless the habeas petitioner prefers to have his entire petition dismissed. In any event, if the judge' rules on those issues that are ripe and dismisses those that are not, .1 would not tax the petitioner with abuse of the writ if he returns with the latter claims after seeking state relief.