holding that a defense lawyer paid by the state is not a state actor because the relationship between the lawyer and client is “identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client, except for the source of … payment. The legal system posits that a … lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on the State’s behalf or in concert with it, but rather by advancing the undivided interests of the client. This is essentially a private function for which state office and authority are not needed”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defense lawyer paid by the state is not a state actor because the relationship between the lawyer and client is “identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client, except for the source of … payment. The legal system posits that a … lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on the State’s behalf or in concert with it, but rather by advancing the undivided interests of the client. This is essentially a private function for which state office and authority are not needed”
- holding that, while public defender does not act under color of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, public defender may act under color of state law when performing other functions on behalf of the state such as hiring and firing employees or engaging in certain administrative or investigative functions
- holding that public defender is not a "state actor," reasoning that public defender's role is traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not needed, and rejecting argument that "employment relationship" alone establishes state-actor element of § 1983 claim
- holding that a public defender does not act “under color of state law” because he “works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client” and because there is an “assumption that counsel will be free of state control”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Thomas v. Pearl, 793 F. Supp. 838 (1992)
454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), is distinguishable.
Distinguished by West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)
We disagree with the Court of Appeals and respondent that Polk County dictates a conclusion that respondent did
The opinion
Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, but it is important to emphasize that in providing counsel for an accused the governmental participation is very limited. Under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), the government undertakes only to provide a professionally qualified advocate wholly independent of the government. It is the independence from governmental control as to how the assigned task is to be performed that is crucial. The advocate, as an officer of the court which issued the commission to practice, owes an obligation to the court to repudiate any external effort to direct how the obligations to the client are to be carried out. The obligations owed by the attorney to the client are defined by the professional codes, not by the governmental entity from which the defense advocate’s compensation is derived. Disciplinary Rule 5-107 (B) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility * succinctly states the rule:
*328 “(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”
Moreover, it is elementary that every advocate has an obligation to eschew proceedings considered to be professionally improper or irresponsible. Once counsel in this case reached a considered judgment on the merits of the claim sought to be put forward, her actions were consistent with the highest traditions of the Bar.
See, e. g., ABA Code Of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5 (1976): “A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client.” Ethical Consideration 5-1 explains this Canon:
“The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.”
See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Ch. 3, The Defense Function, Ch. 4 (2d ed. 1980).