explaining that ”[t]he interpretation put on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, but the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement” (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that ”[t]he interpretation put on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, but the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement” (citations omitted)
- explaining that the FEC “is precisely the type of agency to which deference should presumptively be afforded” because the FEC is inherently bipartisan and has “primary and substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act” and authority to “formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act”
- holding that agency interpretation of statute set forth in an Advisory Opinion rather than in a regulation was entitled to deference, "whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking”, when interpretation is not "inconsistent with the statutory mandate” and does not "frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement"
- suggesting that scope of § 504 private right of action not bound by agency regulations
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
The issue presented in this case is whether the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) violated the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U. S. C. §441 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), by making expenditures that state political committees are authorized to make under §441a(d)(l). Section 441a(d)(l) authorizes “the national committee of a political party and a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee,” to make certain expenditures in connection with a candidate’s general election campaign, subject to defined limitations. See §441a(d)(3). Since the NRSC clearly is not “the national committee of a political party,” 1 or “a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee,” 2 it is clear that nothing in § 441a(d)(3) limits the permissible expenditure of funds by the NRSC.
The NRSC is, however, a “political committee” as that term is defined in the statute. 3 Section 441a(a)(2)(A) pro *44 vides that no multicandidate political committee may make contributions to a candidate that exceed $5,000. 4 Section 441a(h) provides, however, that “amounts totaling not more than $17,500 may be contributed to a candidate for nomination for election, or for election, to the United States Senate during the year in which an election is held in which he is such a candidate, by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee . . . No section of the statute directly limits expenditures by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees. 5 However, §441a(a)(7) (B)(i) provides that “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”
Thus, the only way that the NRSC could be said to have violated the statute in this case is if it made expenditures “in cooperation, consultation, or concert” with a candidate that exceeded $17,500. The record discloses that the NRSC in several instances made expenditures that exceeded $17,500. As I understand the record, however, it does not demonstrate that these expenditures were made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with the candidates. The record simply is silent on this point.
The only way that the NRSC could be said to have violated the statute, therefore, is if, as a matter of law, it is incapable of making expenditures that are not made in cooperation, *45 consultation, or concert with a candidate. In other words, the NRSC could not be said to have violated the statute unless the NRSC is deemed as a matter of law to be an agent of the candidate on whose behalf it expends funds. If this is the case, however, it would appear to me to follow almost automatically that the NRSC may act as an agent for the state committees in spending the amounts that state committees are authorized to spend by § 441a(d), since state committees are largely controlled by the state candidates that they serve. It would seem incongruous to hold that the NRSC must be treated as an agent of a candidate when it makes expenditures, but may not act as a lawful agent of that candidate’s state committee.
I concur fully in the conclusion of the Court that the agency relationship utilized in this case does not violate the Act, and I join its opinion subject only to the caveat that I am not entirely sure that the expenditures at issue in this case “otherwise would be impermissible,” ante, at 28, and n. 1. I assume, arguendo, that this is so, for otherwise petitioners would bear absolutely no burden to justify the expenditures made in this case. 6
Section 431(14) defines the term “national committee” as “the organization which, by virtue of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level, as determined by the Commission.” 2 U. S. C. §431 (14) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
Section 431(15) defines the term “State committee” as “the organization which, by virtue of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the State level, as determined by the Commission.” 2 U. S. C. §431 (15) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
Section 431(4) defines the term “political committee” as-—
“(A) any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year . . . .” 2 U. S. C. §431 (4) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
Section 441a(a)(2)(A) provides:
“No multicandidate political committee shall make contributions—
“(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
The Act carefully distinguishes between “contributions” and “expenditures.” See §431(8) (defining the term “contribution”); §431(9) (defining the term “expenditure”).
Moreover, this case would have been much easier for me to decide if the parties had begun their presentations with an appropriate explanation of the relevant provisions of the statute instead of an unstated assumption that is not entirely obvious.