explaining that, under federal law, discrimination claims accrue at “the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful,” and finding that plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claims accrued on the date the employer told the plaintiffs they were anticipated to be fired, not on the date plaintiffs were actually fired, because the illegal act was the decision to fire the plaintiffs, not the firing itself
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, under federal law, discrimination claims accrue at “the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful,” and finding that plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claims accrued on the date the employer told the plaintiffs they were anticipated to be fired, not on the date plaintiffs were actually fired, because the illegal act was the decision to fire the plaintiffs, not the firing itself
- holding that the “proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful”
- concluding that plaintiff’s 45-day limitations period began to run when he had notice of his termination, not the effective date of the termination
- holding that claims of administrators of the Puerto Rican Department of Education were untimely because their claims accrued when they received notice that they would be fired and not on the effective date of their terminations
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68 (2004)
Ricks and Chardon are inapposite to the case at bar.
Distinguished by Courtney v. La Salle University, 124 F.3d 499 (1997)
Situations like Ricks and Chardon are distinguishable; there the “alleged unlawful practice occur[s]” when the discriminatory decision, e.g., to deny tenure, or to terminate the employee, is made based on an impermissible factor.
The opinion
Per Curiam.
Respondents were nontenured administrators in the Puerto Rico Department of Education during the 1976-1977 *7 school year. 1 On dates prior to June 18, 1977, each respondent was notified by letter that his appointment would terminate at a specified date between June 30 and August 8, 1977. On June 19, 1978, Rafael Rivera Fernandez filed a complaint alleging that the terminations violated 42 U. S. C. § 1983 . The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the action had accrued on the date the employees received the letters and that the claims were therefore barred by the applicable 1-year statute of limitations, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 31, § 5298(2) (1968). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed on the ground that the limitations period did not begin running until respondents’ appointments ended. 648 F. 2d 765 (1981).
The decision below is contrary to a recent decision of this Court: Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980). In that case, Ricks filed suit alleging that the denial of tenure at a state college deprived him of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 . And we held that the applicable limitations periods began to run when Ricks was denied tenure, rather than on the date his employment terminated. His action was, therefore, time-barred.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Ricks on the ground that Ricks had alleged that denial of tenure was the “unlawful employment practice,” whereas here respondents allege that termination of their employment as administrators was the “unlawful employment practice.” *8 We think Ricks is indistinguishable. When Ricks was denied tenure, he was given a 1-year “terminal” contract. Thus, in each case, the operative decision was made — and notice given — in advance of a designated date on which employment terminated. 2
In Ricks , we held that the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful. 449 U. S., at 258 . The fact of termination is not itself an illegal act. In Ricks , the alleged illegal act was racial discrimination in the tenure decision. Id., at 259 . Here, respondents allege that the decision to terminate was made solely for political reasons, violative of First Amendment rights. There were no other allegations, either in Ricks or in these cases, of illegal acts subsequent to the date on which the decisions to terminate were made. As we noted in Ricks , “[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Id., at 257 . In the cases at bar, respondents were notified, when they received their letters, that a final decision had been made to terminate their appointments. The fact that they were afforded reasonable notice cannot extend the period within which suit must be filed. We therefore grant certiorari. The judgments entered below on May 8, 1981, and June 11, 1981, are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
Petitioners request a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to review a total of 14 judgments entered in favor of 36 respondents. The published decision, discussed in text, represents one judgment in a suit brought by 23 respondents; that decision was issued May 8, 1981. See 648 F. 2d 765 (1981). Identical individual judgments in favor of the other 13 respondents were issued on June 11, 1981. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a (unpublished orders).
Delaware State College had a policy of giving a final 1-year contract to teachers who were denied tenure. Only when that contract expired, did the “employment relationship en[d].” 449 U. S., at 253 . Apparently, the practice of the Puerto Rico Department of Education was similar in principle. Following a decision to terminate, the actual ending of employment was deferred to a designated date. Advance notice of termination is a customary and reasonable employment practice which affords the employee an opportunity to find another job.