finding no allegation of a violation of procedural due process when the deprivation of property “did not occur as a result of some established state procedure” but was instead due to “the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established state procedure”; moreover, the respondent did not contend that the procedures themselves were inadequate, and the State “provided respondent with the means by which he can receive redress for the deprivation,” but respondent did not use those procedures
How later courts described this case
- finding no allegation of a violation of procedural due process when the deprivation of property “did not occur as a result of some established state procedure” but was instead due to “the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established state procedure”; moreover, the respondent did not contend that the procedures themselves were inadequate, and the State “provided respondent with the means by which he can receive redress for the deprivation,” but respondent did not use those procedures
- reasoning that a plaintiff's § 1983 procedural due process claim "differ[ed] from the claims which were before [the Court] in Monroe v. Pape, [365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)], which involved violations of the Fourth Amendment, and the claims presented in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 [97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251] (1976), which involved alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment"
- reasoning that a plaintiffs § 1983 procedural due process claim “differed] from the claims which were before [the Court] in Monroe v. Pape, [365 U.S. 167, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961)], which involved violations of the Fourth Amendment, and the claims presented in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 [50 L. Ed. 2d 251] (1976), which involved alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment”
- holding that a deprivation of property that “occurred as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established state procedure” does not violate the Due Process Clause where “[t]here is no contention that the procedures themselves are inadequate” and a meaningful post-deprivation state remedy is available
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 184, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJan 21, 19861735 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itOverruled on other grounds by Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)
451 U.S. 527, 535 , 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 , 106 S.Ct. 668 , 88 L.Ed.2d 677
Questioned by Natasha Thomas Susan Gibbs and Edwina Lewis v. Ann Cohen Glenn Craig James Embry and Susan Fischer, in Their Individual Capacities, 304 F.3d 563 (2002)
However, this reading of Parratt has since been called into question.
Declined to follow by Larry T. Wilson, and Cross-Appellant v. Thomas L. Beebe, and Cross-Appellee, 743 F.2d 342 (1984)
Because of the importance of protecting liberty interests such as those involved in the case at bar, we decline to extend the narrow language of Parratt beyond cases alleging negligent deprivations of property interests.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 921 F. Supp. 2d 835 (2013)
The Parratt rule, however, is inapplicable here.
Distinguished by Martin v. City of Glasgow, 882 F. Supp. 2d 903 (2012)
Where however the state does not offer a post-deprivation procedure to remedy the governmental action, Parratt is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Oxford Bank & Trust & Fifth Avenue Property Management v. Village of La Grange, 879 F. Supp. 2d 954 (2012)
Wilson indeed draws this distinction and states that “a complaint asserting municipal liability under Monell by definition states a claim to which Parratt is inapposite.
Distinguished by Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548 (2005)
But where, as in Zinermon, state employees do have broad authority to effect deprivations, as well as the duty to provide predeprivation procedural safeguards, the Parratt /Hudson doctrine is inapplicable.14 Therefore, we can only conclude that, under the Parratt /Hudson doctrine, the random and unauthorized euthanization of Bogart's animals by the Defendants — however atrocious — did not constitute a violation of Bo…
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds that negligent conduct by persons acting under color of state law *555 may be actionable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 . Ante, at 534-535. I also agree with the majority that in cases involving claims of negligent deprivation of property without due process of law, the availability of an adequate postdeprivation cause of action for damages under state law may preclude a finding of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. I part company with the majority, however, over its conclusion that there was an adequate state-law remedy available to respondent in this case. My disagreement with the majority is not because of any shortcomings in the Nebraska tort claims procedure. 1 Rather, my problem is with the majority’s application of its legal analysis to the facts of this case.
It is significant, in my view, that respondent is a state prisoner whose access to information about his legal rights is necessarily limited by his confinement. Furthermore, there is no claim that either petitioners or any other officials informed respondent that he could seek redress for the alleged deprivation of his property by filing an action under the Nebraska tort claims procedure. This apparent failure takes *556 on additional significance in light of the fact that respondent pursued his complaint about the missing hobby kit through the prison's grievance procedure. 2 In cases such as this, I believe prison officials have an affirmative obligation to inform a prisoner who claims that he is aggrieved by official action about the remedies available under state law. If they fail to do so, then they should not be permitted to rely on the existence of such remedies as adequate alternatives to a § 1983 action for wrongful deprivation of property. Since these prison officials do not represent that respondent was informed about his rights under state law, I cannot join in the judgment of the Court in this case.
Thus, although I agree with much of the majority’s reasoning, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
To be sure, the state remedies would not have afforded respondent all the relief that would have been available in a § 1983 action. See ante, at 543-544. I nonetheless agree with the majority that “they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.” Ante, at 544.
In fact, the prison officials did not raise the issue of the availability of a state-law remedy in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. The issue was first presented in the petition for rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals.