holding that the Illinois real estate tax process provided a “plain, speedy and efficient” procedure for resolving objections, notwithstanding that taxpayers are required to pay under protest, no interest is provided for refunds, and objections often take two years to resolve, such that plaintiff could not advance a Section 1983 suit concerning disputed funds
How later courts described this case
- holding that the Illinois real estate tax process provided a “plain, speedy and efficient” procedure for resolving objections, notwithstanding that taxpayers are required to pay under protest, no interest is provided for refunds, and objections often take two years to resolve, such that plaintiff could not advance a Section 1983 suit concerning disputed funds
- explaining that if injunctive relief prohibiting the collection of a state tax was available, then "during the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State's budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency."
- holding that not “every wrinkle of federal equity practice” addressing whether a remedy was plain, adequate, and complete was codified by Congress in the TIA, but further specifying that “prior federal equity cases” may be “instructive on whether a state remedy is ‘plain, speedy and efficient’”
- holding the same with regard to payment of interest and stating that "There is no question that under the Illinois procedure, the court will hear and decide any federal claim. Paying interest or eliminating delay would not make the remedy any more ‘plain.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Goodman v. Burris, 695 F. Supp. 973 (1988)
Plaintiff argues that he is not questioning the tax system of the State of Illinois, and thus McNary and Rosewell are inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, but I must confess that in doing so I participate in the decision with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. I am aware of just how frustrating it can be for a conscientious property taxpayer who encounters what ap *529 pears to him to be unfairness, arbitrariness, delay, and an inadequacy of redress even though he might ultimately prevail on his basic contentions about existing property tax assessment and collection methods. Nearly every municipality encounters like criticism. Justice Stevens’ dissent, however, indicates that Cook County’s system surely is not one of the better ones.
But the Tax Injunction Act was passed for a specific purpose and I very much doubt that the cure, although it may provide a headache, is worse than the disease.
The Court’s opinion demonstrates, I think, that the remedy provided by Illinois law qualifies, though perhaps only barely, as “plain, speedy and efficient,” within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, and that federal jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief is therefore statutorily barred. Illinois — and particularly Cook County — may have little reason to be proud of the system, but it seems to pass muster under the Act. One might well hope, even though forlornly, that that system and its administration will be improved so that uncomfortable and distressing litigation like this case need not be pursued.