holding that the rule of lenity is inapplicable where the “statutory provisions ... are unambiguous on their face and [the] legislative history ... gives us no reason to pause over the manner in which these provisions should be interpreted”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the rule of lenity is inapplicable where the “statutory provisions ... are unambiguous on their face and [the] legislative history ... gives us no reason to pause over the manner in which these provisions should be interpreted”
- holding that Congress intended to permit dual convictions of conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana even though such violations arose from a single agreement or conspiracy having dual objectives
- holding that conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to import marijuana “specify different ends . . . distribution as opposed to importation” and “each provision requires proof of a fact [that] the other does not”
- holding that “the same conduct may be treated as two offenses” where “each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not” such as a different victim
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Tomeny, 144 F.3d 749 (1998)
U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (holding that the rule of lenity is inapplicable where the “statutory provisions ... are unambiguous on their face and [the] legislative history ... gives us no reason to pause over the manner in which these provisions should be interpreted”);
The opinion
Justice Stewart,
with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens join, concurring in the judgment.
In Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 688 , the Court said that “the question whether punishments imposed by a *345 court after a defendant’s conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.”
But that is a far cry from what the Court says today: “[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Con-sitution.” Ante, at 344. These statements are supported by neither precedent nor reasoning and are unnecessary to reach the Court’s conclusion.
No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not, under the criterion of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 .
Since Congress has created two offenses here, and since each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, I concur in the judgment.