holding that a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he receives notice of termination, not when his employment actually ceases, “the only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations period therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a plaintiffs cause of action accrues when he receives notice of termination, not when his employment actually ceases, “the only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations period therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later.”
- holding that plaintiff professor’s Title VII claim for discriminatory denial of tenure was untimely where the denial was made and communicated to him outside the limitations period even though the employment actually ended within the limitations period, and noting that “the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful” (emphasis in original)
- holding no continuing tort occurred where plaintiff alleged an “ongoing violation” of his civil rights, because “[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination” and that plaintiff must identify the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until termination of his employment
- concluding, 12 in the context of a denial of tenure that was communicated well before the eventual loss of employment, “the only alleged discrimination occurred . . . at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated. . . . even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure—the eventual loss of a teaching position— did not occur until later”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) — not on the Supreme Court's list
See, Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S. Ct. 498, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1980), abrogated on other grounds, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 *478 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 52 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1977).
Questioned by Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 576 F. Supp. 1461 (1983)
449 U.S. at 255, 256, 101 S.Ct. at 502, 503, calls into serious question the continued viability of
Declined to follow by Turner v. IDS Financial Services, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 143 (1990)
We decline to extend the reasoning of Ricks to an employment discharge case as the Court did in Chardon.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 319 F. Supp. 3d 358 (2018)
Mr. Golden's case is distinguishable from Ricks because Mr. Golden has called into question the propriety of his termination itself, explaining that he "was terminated by Job Corps for allegedly not successfully completing the requirements of the 2015 PIP despite receiving a satisfactory rating from Mr. Stroman," his supervisor who had instituted the PIP, "during the same time period." 2d Am.
Distinguished by Stewart v. Gates, 786 F. Supp. 2d 155 (2011)
U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), which the defendants rely on, is inapposite here.
Distinguished by Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68 (2004)
Ricks and Chardon are inapposite to the case at bar.
Distinguished by Holmin v. TRW, INC., 330 N.J. Super. 30 (2000)
It concluded that Ricks was inapplicable because Ricks dealt with a denial of tenure whereas the plaintiffs in Chardon alleged an unlawful termination.
The opinion
Justice Stewart,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
I agree with the Court that the unlawful employment practice alleged in the respondent’s complaint was a discrimina *263 tory denial of tenure, not a discriminatory termination of employment. See ante, at 257-259, and nn. 8, 9. Nevertheless, I believe that a fair reading of the complaint reveals a plausible allegation that the College actually denied Ricks tenure on September 12, 1974, the date on which the Board finally confirmed its decision to accept the faculty’s recommendation that he not be given tenure.
Therefore, unlike the Court, I think Ricks should be allowed to prove to the District Court that the allegedly unlawful denial of tenure occurred on that date. 1 As noted by the Court, see ante, at 260, n. 13, if Ricks succeeds in this proof, his § 1981 claim would certainly be timely, and the timeliness of his Title VII claim would then depend on whether his filing of a complaint with the Delaware Department of Labor entitled him to file his EEOC charge within 300 days of the discriminatory act, rather than within the 180 days’ limitation that the Court of Appeals and the District Court assumed to be applicable. 2
A brief examination of the June 26, 1974, letter to Ricks *264 from the Board of Trustees, quoted by the Court, ante, at 253, n. 2, provides a reasonable basis for the allegation that the College did not effectively deny Ricks tenure until September 12. The letter informed Ricks of the Board’s “intent not to renew” his contract at the end of the 1974-1975 academic year. And the letter suggested that the Board was so informing Ricks at that time only to ensure technical compliance with College and American Association of University Professors requirements in case it should later decide to abide by its earlier acceptance of the faculty’s recommendation that Ricks be denied tenure. The Board expressly stated in the letter that it had “no way of knowing” what the outcome of the grievance process might be, but that a decision of the Board’s Educational Policy Committee favorable to Ricks would “of course . . . supersede any previous action taken by the Board.”
Thus, the Board itself may have regarded its earlier actions as tentative or preliminary, pending a thorough review triggered by the respondent’s request to the Committee. The Court acknowledges that this letter expresses the Board’s willingness to change its earlier view on Ricks’ tenure, but considers the grievance procedure under which the decision might have been changed to be a remedy for an earlier tenure decision and not a part of the overall process of making the initial tenure decision. Ricks, however, may be able to prove to the District Court that at his College the original Board response to the faculty’s recommendation was not a virtually final action subject to reopening only in the most extreme cases, but a preliminary decision to advance the tenure question to the Board’s grievance committee as the next conventional stage in the process. 3
*265 Whether this is an accurate view of the tenure process at Delaware State College is, of course, a factual question we cannot resolve here. But Ricks lost his case in the trial court on a motion to dismiss. I think that motion was wrongly-granted, and that Ricks was entitled to a hearing and a determination of this factual issue. See Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F. 2d 202 (CA9).
I would, therefore, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court so that it can make this determination and then, if necessary, resolve whether Title VII allowed Ricks 300 days from the denial of tenure to file his charge with the Commission.
The Court treats the District Court’s determination of June 26, 1974, as the date of tenure denial as a factual finding which is not clearly erroneous. Ante, at 261-262. But it must be stressed that the District Court dismissed Ricks’ claims on the pleadings, and so never made factual determinations on this or any other issue.
Title VII would allow Ricks 300 days if he had “initially instituted” proceedings with a local or state agency with authority to grant him relief. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e); see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 . To benefit from this provision, however, Ricks would arguably have had to make a timely filing with the state agency. Delaware law requires that a charge of discrimination be filed with the Department of Labor within 90 days after the allegedly discriminatory practice occurred or within 120 days after the practice is discovered, whichever date is later. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 19, § 712(d) (1979). Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered the timeliness of Ricks’ filing with the state agency, nor the significance of the state agency’s action in waiving jurisdiction over Ricks’ charge, and so these questions would be appropriately addressed on remand.
This view is consistent with the policies and model procedures of the American Association of University Professors, AAUP Policy Documents and Reports 15, 29 (1977); see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 578-579 , and n. 17; Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae 9-10, on whose *265 requirements the Board of Trustees in this case expressly relied in explaining its action in the June 26 letter.