holding that an investigatory stop of the defendant could not be based on the mere fact that defendant had occasionally looked backward at another person as they proceeded through an airport concourse, even though defendant had arrived from a city that was a principal place of origin of cocaine, the defendant had arrived in the early morning, when law enforcement surveillance activity was reduced, defendant and his companion appeared to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together, and defendant and his companion apparently had no luggage other than their shoulder bags
How later courts described this case
- holding that an investigatory stop of the defendant could not be based on the mere fact that defendant had occasionally looked backward at another person as they proceeded through an airport concourse, even though defendant had arrived from a city that was a principal place of origin of cocaine, the defendant had arrived in the early morning, when law enforcement surveillance activity was reduced, defendant and his companion appeared to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together, and defendant and his companion apparently had no luggage other than their shoulder bags
- concluding that a drug enforcement agent’s hunch was insufficient to justify a Terry stop, where the agent had observed the defendant, a departing airline passenger, look back occasionally at another passenger as they proceeded through the terminal, had noted that the two men carried similar shoulder bags, had seen them meet and speak briefly as they left the terminal together, and believed on the basis of these observations that the two were attempting to conceal the fact that they were traveling together
- finding that arriving early in the morning, when law enforcement activity is lower, from a known drug-source state with no luggage other than shoulder bags was not sufficient for reasonable suspicion because those factors “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in [that] case could justify a seizure”
- finding no reasonable suspicion in large part because defendant’s arrival “from Fort Lauderdale, which the agent testified is a principal place of origin of cocaine sold elsewhere in the country!,] • • • describe[d] a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Babb, 77 F. App'x 761 (2003)
Therefore, Reid is distinguishable.
Distinguished by People v. Lebron, 161 Ill. App. 3d 815 (1987)
Because we have found that the detention of Lebron did not amount to an investigatory stop, Reid is inapplicable to the circumstances at bar.
The opinion
Me. Justice Rehnquist
dissents for the reasons stated by Me. Justice Stewaet in his opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). He believes that the police conduct involved did not implicate the Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment rights of the petitioners.