explaining the importance of lesser included offense instructions and stating that .to "expect a jury to ... find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime" is to "require[ ] of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining the importance of lesser included offense instructions and stating that .to "expect a jury to ... find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime" is to "require[ ] of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- recognizing that a death sentence is a '"different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country . . . in both its severity and its finality"' [quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 , 97 S. Ct. 1197 , 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977)]; court has duty to set aside procedures that undermine the 59 reliability of the jury's determination
- holding that in a capital case due process requires that a jury be given the option of convicting the defendant on a lesser included noncapital offense if the evidence would support conviction on that offense to avoid presenting juries with a “death or nothing” choice between conviction of a capital crime and finding the defendant not guilty
- finding that "when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense,” but leaves some doubt regarding an element that would justify a capital conviction, failure to give jury the " ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense ... enhance[s] the risk of an unwarranted conviction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited on other grounds by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)
447 U.S. 625, 638 , 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2390 , 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 402-403 , limited on other grounds, Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States ex rel. Parish v. Hodge, 73 F. Supp. 3d 895 (2014)
) Respondent argues that Beck is inapplicable here because this is a noncapital case.
Distinguished by United States v. Mariano Alvarez, 561 F. App'x 375 (2014)
447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), is readily distinguishable.
Distinguished by Lane v. State, 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 103 (2013)
However, Beck is distinguishable from the present case.
Distinguished by Hall v. Thomas, 977 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (2013)
Beck is also distinguishable because, unlike this issue, it involved the question of whether a state-law prohibition on giving lesser included offense instructions in capital cases violated the Eighth Amendment by substantially increasing the risk of error in the fact-finding process.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring in the judgment.
I continue to believe that the death penalty is, under all circumstances, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314-374 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231-241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 433-442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). In addition, I agree with the Court that Alabama’s prohibition on giving lesser included offense instructions in capital cases is unconstitutional because it substantially increases the risk of error in the factfinding process. I do not, however, join in the Court’s assumption that the death penalty may ever be imposed without violating the command of the Eighth Amendment that no “cruel and unusual punishments” be imposed. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 621 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637, 643-644 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). I join in the judgment of the Court.