concluding that Spinkellink’s language precluding federal courts from reviewing state court application of capital sentencing criteria no longer valid
How later courts described this case
- concluding that Spinkellink’s language precluding federal courts from reviewing state court application of capital sentencing criteria no longer valid
- holding that “if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty” and must “channel” the sentencer’s discretion by “ ‘clear and objective standards’ ” that provide “ ‘specific and detailed guidance’ ” and “ ‘make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death’ ”
- holding that the jury instruction was insufficient and reversing where the instruction stated that the death penalty should be imposed if the murder was “ ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman,’ ” as almost anyone could characterize any murder as satisfying that standard
- holding that capital sentencing statutes must "channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Stamper v. Baskerville, 531 F. Supp. 1122 (1982)
446 U.S. 420, 428-30, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764-1766, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) casts doubt on the clarity which the Supreme Court perceived in identical language used in the jury charge in
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Waddler, 65 Va. Cir. 418 (2004)
Thus, Godfrey is inapposite to the present issue, which involved only Goins’ motion for a bill of particulars.
Distinguished by State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631 (1993)
Maynard and Godfrey are inapposite.
Distinguished by Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)
Maynard v. Cartwright and Godfrey v. Georgia, however, are distinguishable in two constitutionally significant respects.
Distinguished by Christopher A. Burger, Cross-Appellant v. Walter A. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Cross-Appellee, 718 F.2d 979 (1983)
Id. This court distinguished Stanley from Godfrey on the grounds that the charge used in the former (as well as in this case) required the jury to find that the crime involved both torture and depravity of mind, whereas the formulation used by the trial judge in Godfrey was phrased in the disjunctive language of the statute and permitted the jury to sentence the defendant to death on finding that the crime
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
After murdering his wife and mother-in-law, petitioner informed the police that he had committed a “hideous” crime. The dictionary defines hideous as “morally offensive,” “shocking,” or “horrible.” Thus, the very curious feature of this case is that petitioner himself characterized his crime in terms equivalent to those employed in the Georgia statute. For *443 my part, I prefer petitioner’s characterization of his conduct to the plurality’s effort to excuse and rationalize that conduct as just another killing. Ante, at 433. The jurors in this case, who heard all relevant mitigating evidence, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), obviously shared that preference; they concluded that this “hideous” crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” within the meaning of § (b)(7).
More troubling than the plurality’s characterization of petitioner’s crime is the new responsibility that it assumes with today’s decision — the task of determining on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant’s conduct is egregious enough to warrant a death sentence. In this new role, the plurality appears to require “evidence of serious physical abuse” before a death sentence can be imposed under § (b) (7). Ante, at 431. For me, this new requirement is arbitrary and unfounded and trivializes the Constitution. Consider, for example, the Georgia case of Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 , 230 S. E. 2d 1 (1976), where the defendant killed a young woman for the thrill of it. As he later confessed, he “didn’t want nothing [she] got except [her] life.” Id., at 720 , 230 S. E. 2d, at 4 . Does the plurality opinion mean to suggest that anything in the Constitution precludes a state from imposing a death sentence on such a merciless, gratuitous killer? The plurality’s novel physical torture requirement may provide an “objective” criterion, but it hardly separates those for whom a state may prescribe the death sentence from those for whom it may not.
In short, I am convinced that the course the plurality embarks on today is sadly mistaken — indeed confused. It is this Court’s function to insure that the rights of a defendant are scrupulously respected; and in capital cases we must see to it that the jury has rendered its decision with meticulous care. But it is emphatically not our province to second-guess the jury’s judgment or to tell the states which of their “hide *444 ous,” intentional murderers may be given the ultimate penalty. Because the plurality does both, I dissent.