holding that § 924(c) does not apply to a defendant “who uses a firearm in the course of a felony that is proscribed by a statute which itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used”
How later courts described this case
- holding that § 924(c) does not apply to a defendant “who uses a firearm in the course of a felony that is proscribed by a statute which itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used”
- holding that earlier version of § 924(c) could not be applied to a defendant who uses a firearm during the course of a felony which itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used
- holding that “a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence”
- describing provisions for using dangerous or deadly weapon under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111, relating to assaulting officer, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c), relating to use of firearm in committing felony, as enhanced penalty provisions for double jeopardy purposes
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. Gonzales — not on the Supreme Court's list
For example, the Supreme Court held in Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 10, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997), that the defendant could not be sentenced under the statutory enhancement provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (providing an enhanced penalty for using a firearm in connectio…
Supreme Court of the United StatesMar 3, 19974 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Michael K. Scott, 804 F.2d 104 (1986)
446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980), are factually inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Noble R. Starnes and Clifford Roland, 644 F.2d 673 (1981)
446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980), is inapposite in this case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
with whom The Chief Justice joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, holding that the decision in Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6 (1978), leads to the conclusion that 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) is inapplicable where a defendant is charged with committing a substantive federal offense violative of a statute that already provides for enhanced punishment for the use of a firearm.
*413 It should be made clear, however, that the Court of Appeals’ initial opinion in these cases, discussed by the Court, ante, at 401-402, reflects the confusion that has existed among lower courts about the meaning of this Court’s recent pronouncements respecting the multiple punishments aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 697-698 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). The Court of Appeals there rejected the view that Congress did not intend the enhancement provisions of § 924 (c) to apply when the substantive offense charged was 18 U. S. C. § 111 . See 587 F. 2d 577, 581-582 , and n. 3. The decision in Simpson , of course, revealed the error of that holding. But the Court of Appeals went on to hold that regardless of Congress’ intent to provide for enhanced punishment in this context, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented it from doing so, at least in certain eases. See id., at 582-584. I do not subscribe to that view, and write separately only to state, once again, that it is my belief that when defendants are sentenced in a single proceeding, “the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S., at 698 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).