holding that a police officer’s subjective intent to obtain incriminatory statements is not relevant to determining whether an interrogation has occurred
How later courts described this case
- holding that a police officer’s subjective intent to obtain incriminatory statements is not relevant to determining whether an interrogation has occurred
- finding that brief conversation between patrolmen was not functional equivalent of questioning when there was nothing to suggest that'the police knew that the suspect was susceptible to the subject matter of their conversation, nothing suggested that the suspect was unusu *283 ally disoriented or upset, and nothing suggested the remarks were designed to elicit a response
- holding that under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution “interrogation” “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” (footnote omitted)
- holding that officers’ conversation amongst themselves, with the suspect in the car, about concerns of disabled children finding the weapon used in the crime was not the functional equivalent of interrogation because there was no evidence the conversation was specifically designed to prey on the suspect’s sympathies in this regard
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by People v. Villa-Gomez, 9 Cal. App. 5th 527 (2017)
Nothing the Elizalde court wrote suggests its holding should apply to crimes that have not yet been committed at the time of the inquiry, and we decline to extend Miranda and Innis that far.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Hoskins, 197 Ohio App. 3d 635 (2012)
{¶ 19} Innis and Waggoner, however, are clearly distinguishable from the facts present in the instant case.
Distinguished by Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245 (2011)
446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, are distinguishable because they involve situations where the accused initiated communications.
Distinguished by Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969 (1994)
We find that the facts in Innis are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances in the instant case.
Distinguished by Stanley v. State, 261 Ga. 412 (1991)
Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 839 (4) (295 SE2d 74) (1982), and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (100 SC 1682, 64 LE2d 297) (1980), relied on by Stanley, are distinguishable because the defendants in those cases, unlike Stanley, had invoked their right to consult an attorney.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the judgment.
Since the result is not inconsistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), I concur in the judgment.
The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda , disparage it, nor extend it at this late date. I fear, however, that the rationale in Parts II-A and II-B of the Court’s opinion will not clarify the tension between this holding and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), and our other cases. It may introduce new elements of uncertainty; under the Court’s test, a police officer, in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused. See, e. g., ante, at 302, n. 8. Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated; even a psychiatrist asked to express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in custody would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to make the judgment now charged to police officers.
*305 Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the boundaries and nuances flowing from post-Miranda opinions, and we do not clarify that situation today. *
That we may well be adding to the confusion is suggested by the problem dealt with in California v. Braeseke, 444 U. S. 1309 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (difficulty of determining whether a defendant has waived his Miranda rights), and cases cited therein.