concluding that de- fendants, who had escaped from prison, were not entitled to an instruction on the duress or necessity defenses because “a bona fide effort to surren- der or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force” was “an indispensable element” of each defense and “[v]ague and necessarily self-serving statements of defendants or wit- nesses as to future good intentions or ambiguous conduct simply d[id] not support a finding of this element”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that de- fendants, who had escaped from prison, were not entitled to an instruction on the duress or necessity defenses because “a bona fide effort to surren- der or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force” was “an indispensable element” of each defense and “[v]ague and necessarily self-serving statements of defendants or wit- nesses as to future good intentions or ambiguous conduct simply d[id] not support a finding of this element”
- holding that escape is a continuing offense because the escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody and “[g]iven the continuing threat to society posed by an escaped prisoner, ‘the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one’ ” (quoting Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858)
- recognizing that, whatever its precise formula in a particular jurisdiction, “one principle [of duress] remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm, the defense[] will fail” (internal quotations omitted)
- holding, in the context of necessity, that "if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,' the defense[ ] will fail" (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 379 (1972) )
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
The essential difference between the majority and the dissent is over the question whether the record contains enough evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody to present a question of fact for the jury to resolve. On this issue, I agree with the Court that the evidence introduced by defendants Cooley, Bailey, and Cogdell was plainly insuffi *418 cient. Vague references to anonymous intermediaries are so inherently incredible that a trial judge is entitled to ignore them. With respect to Walker, however, the question is much closer because he testified that he personally telephoned an FBI agent three times in an effort to negotiate a surrender. 1 But since he remained at large for about two months after his last effort to speak with the FBI, I am persuaded that even under his version of the facts he did not make an adequate attempt to satisfy the return requirement.
The fact that I have joined the Court’s opinion does not indicate that I — or indeed that any other Member of the majority — is unconcerned about prison conditions described by Mr. Justice Blackmun. Because we are construing the federal escape statute, however, I think it only fair to note that such conditions are more apt to prevail in state or county facilities than in federal facilities. 2 Moreover, reasonable men may well differ about the most effective methods of redressing the situation. In my view, progress toward acceptable solutions involves formulating enforceable objective standards for civilized prison conditions, 3 keeping the channels of communication between prisoners and the outside world open, 4 and guaranteeing access to the courts, 5 rather than relying on ad hoc judgments about the good faith of *419 prison administrators, 6 giving undue deference to their “expertise” 7 or encouraging self-help by convicted felons. 8 In short, neither my agreement with much of what Mr. Justice Blackmun has written, nor my disagreement with the Court about related issues, prevents me from joining its construction of the federal escape statute.
The rebuttal testimony described by the Court, ante, at 399, n. 2, indicates that Walker was probably not telling the truth; but in deciding whether Walker’s testimony was sufficient, I assume its veracity.
Compare, for example, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 , with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 .
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 116-117 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U. S. 119, 138 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F. 2d 1335, 1344 (CA7 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), modified, 494 F. 2d 85, 87 (CA7 1974) (en banc) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See, e. g., Harris v. Pate, 440 F. 2d 315 (CA7 1971). Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 584-585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It would be unwise, and perhaps counterproductive, to immunize escapes that would otherwise be unlawful in the hope that they would motivate significant reforms. “An unselfish motive affords no assurance that a crime will produce the results its perpetrator intends.” United States v. Cullen, 454 F. 2d 386, 392, n. 17 (CA7 1971). Minimizing the risk of escape is, of course, the classic justification for imposing rigid discipline within prison walls.